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ABSTRACT

BLACK GOLD: MOLLY MAGUIREISM, UNIONISM, AND THE ANTHRACITE LABOR
WARS, 1860-1880
Samantha Edmiston
Old Dominion University, 2017
Director: Elizabeth Zanoni

The class an ethnic tensions that manifested in the anthracite coal fields of Pennsylvania
were a microcosm of the broader, nation-wide labor wars of the late-nineteenth century. These
labor wars, violent and sometimes bloody, shaped workingmen’s condition and the larger history
of unionism. The Molly Maguires, in both their real and imagined form counted as key
protagonists in these wars between big business and unions. More local wars also occurred
between workers, those like the Mollies who wanted to use violence to encourage change, and
others who instead sought to peacefully organize and bargain collectively with their employers.
This thesis intends to ascertain what effect the Molly Maguires and Molly Maguireism
had on the development, success, and failures of unionism in the anthracite region of
Pennsylvania during the middle and late-nineteenth century. Through an examination of the
development of unions and collective action in this area as well as the Irish tradition of
retributive justice, this thesis suggests a complex connection between Molly Maguireism and
unionism. Molly Maguireism existed alongside unionism in the anthracite region from the
beginning and the concentration of violence attributed to the Molly Maguires ebbed and flowed
with union progress. When union development was at its weakest, during the Civil War era and
immediately following the Long Strike of 1875, the incidence of Molly violence increased.
Where unionism valued organization as a means to improve life and labor in the anthracite
region, the Molly Maguires instead used violence as a means to achieve the same end.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

John Kehoe was born in 1837 in County Wicklow, Ireland. He came to America along
with his parents, brothers, and sisters at the age of thirteen. The Kehoe family settled in
Tuscarora, Pennsylvania. Kehoe began working the mines as a teenager and at the age of twenty
he obtained a job at the No. 2 Breaker Colliery of J. B. McCreary & Co. in Audenreid, Schuylkill
County, where he eventually rose to the position of miner. Kehoe became a reasonably wealthy
man in the Irish community of Schuylkill County emerging out of the dregs of mining into a
tavern keeper, and later gaining enough influence to enter into local politics. He set up business
in Girardville as a proprietor of the Hibernia House, a tavern, and was elected high constable of
Girardville for two consecutive terms.1
Historians and contemporaries of Kehoe alike have either maligned Kehoe or overlooked
his somewhat atypically successful life. F. P. Dewees, one of the earliest Molly Maguire
historians, described him as a handsome man with “a cold gray eye” who had “great
determination of character” and “intense selfishness.” Dewees’ also showed his disgust at
Kehoe’s seeming disregard for human life. No doubt, Dewees historical opinion of Kehoe
mirrored head of the Pinkerton Detective Agency Alan Pinkerton’s representation of him as a
diabolical mastermind.2 Anthony Bimba writing in the 1930s, did not even believe the Molly
Maguires existed and so to him, John Kehoe held no real importance. Bimba describes him as

1

Charles A. McCarthy, The Great Molly Maguire Hoax (Wyoming, Penn: Pocket Books, 1969), 90, 1013.
2
F. P. Dewees, The Molly Maguires (New York: Burt Franklin, 1877), 175.
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simply one of the miners the coal establishment executed and scapegoated as means to an end.3
Kehoe became an influential member of the Girardville community and held political ambitions.
These ambitions unfortunately led him in the direction of the Ancient Order of Hibernians
(AOH), a Catholic fraternal organization, through which members elected him Schuylkill County
delegate in 1874. He replaced Bernard Dolan who was accused of embezzlement and expelled
from the order. Because Pinkerton detective James McParlan and so many others believed that
the AOH and the Molly Maguires were that same evil organization, in their minds, victory
against that organization would not be complete until “Black Jack” Kehoe faced the gallows.4
And face the gallows he would. But not until 1878, and for a murder he was found guilty
of committing sixteen years earlier in 1862. That year, F. W. Langdon, a mine foreman, was
assassinated in Audenreid. At the time, the authorities did not convict or apprehend anyone for
the murder, nor was it linked directly to the feared secret society. However, now historians
consider this the first murder committed by the Molly Maguires only because the Pinkerton
Detective Agency and the Coal and Iron police made it so fourteen years later when six men
were finally arraigned at the Pottsville Courthouse for the crime: Neil Dougherty, John
Campbell, Columbus McGhee, Michael McGhee, John Chapman, and John Kehoe. The men
were tried separately.
The murder of Langdon took place against the backdrop of a Fourth of July celebration in
Schuylkill County. During the festivities a group of miners began expressing Copperhead
sentiments, during which John Kehoe allegedly spit on the American flag. Langdon responded
by denouncing the miners which in turn, culminated in the miners shouting threats at the
3

Anthony Bimba, The Molly Maguires, (1932; repr., New York: International Publishers, 1950), 9, 68.
Wayne G. Broehl Jr., The Molly Maguires (New York: Harvard University Press, 1964), 167, 176, 186;
Kevin Kenny, Making Sense of the Molly Maguires (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 222.
4
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foreman. On his way home, an unidentified group of men severely stoned Langdon. He died the
next day. As was the case with most foremen, mine bosses, and supervisors, Langdon was
unpopular with the miners and laborers as his job included checking miners’ coal loads to
determine if the refuse content was too high. Langdon was also an inspection boss in the mine
employing many members of the Kehoe family. Operators paid their miners through a piece-rate
system that became a source of grievance. They forced miners who worked by the ton to adhere
to the “miners’ ton,” which ranged from 2,464 and 3,360 pounds, significantly more than the
standardized ton. Miners complained that this was an unfair weight. Other miners paid by the
wagon load insisted that their bosses had a tendency to increase the amount a wagon could hold,
thus lowering their earnings. Contract miners found the practice of “docking,” or deducting a
certain amount from each payable unit for dirt and slate, a constant irritation.5
Three weeks before the murder, Langdon had docked Kehoe, theoretically giving Kehoe
motive. Several people saw the stoning incident, but were too afraid to come to Langdon’s aid or
go to the authorities. Friends found him semiconscious, but after resting over night, he was able
to walk about a mile away to his home. After being administered treatment by his doctor,
Langdon succumbed to his wounds. Neil Dougherty was found guilty of second degree murder
on November 30, 1876. John Campbell was convicted of second degree murder on January 9,
1877 and sentenced to prison for five years. Michael McGhee was acquitted on May 17 and John
Chapman and Columbus McGhee had all charges dropped.6 These so called demonstrations of
justice served only as precursors to the real intentions of Alan Pinkerton and Franklin Gowen,
president of the Reading and Philadelphia Railroad: to finally persecute John Kehoe.
5

Broehl, The Molly Maguries, 90-91; Harold Aurand, From the Molly Maguires to the United Mine
Workers: The Social Ecology of an Industrial Union, 1869-1897 (Philadelphia: Temple University Press,
1971), 45.
6
Broehl, The Molly Maguires, 334
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The trial of the Commonwealth v. John Kehoe commenced on January 9, 1877 with
Justice Pershing presiding. Kehoe, who was already serving two seven-year terms for two other
conspiracies to commit murder cases, the Major and William M. Thomas murder cases, was now
convicted of first degree murder, a capital offense. Franklin B. Gowen, president of the Reading
and Philadelphia Railroad, returned to Pottsville for the occasion.7 Gowen had also appeared
during the Thomas murder trial on August 8, 1876 where he had stated that not only were Kehoe
and his cronies on trial, but so too was the entirety of the Ancient Order of the Hibernians. Much
of the witness testimony was circumstantial at best. Miners and Langdon’s neighbor, Patrick
Brady, when examined by the prosecution, testified that weeks before Langdon died, Kehoe told
Langdon he was “a son of a bitch” and that he would “kill” him “before long because you only
are robbing me and robbing the people here by your docking.”8 The prosecution presented
contradictory evidence. The night of the murder was dark, the recognition by eyewitnesses
incomplete.
Even though the murder of Langdon occurred in 1862, no one went to a local justice to
have Kehoe arrested at the time. According to Brady’s testimony, there was no Justice of the
Peace to arrest Kehoe, demonstrating the lack of law enforcement in the anthracite region. Brady
also feared that if he became an informant, his “head would be broken” before he got back. “If I
went I would be apt to get the same as Langdon got. But I think I know enough of them - as
much as any man in this state.”9 Many historians argue that the Langdon murder was the first
committed by the Molly Maguires, but the fact that the trial occurred several years after the fact
sullied evidence and rendered witness testimony circumstantial and conflicting or downright
7

Miners’ Journal (hereafter MJ), January 5-12, 1877; Shenandoah Herald, January 5-12 1877.
[E. D. York], Report of the Case of the Commonwealth v John Kehoe, January 9, 1877 (n.p., 1877), 44.
9
[York], Report of the Case of the Commonwealth v. John Kehoe, 46.
8
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inaccurate. The one compelling aspect of Brady’s testimony was his articulation of the fear felt
by the community, fear that prevented men like Brady from seeking justice for Langdon’s fate.
Did the fear stem from the strength of the Mollies’ influence at the time or simply from the long
held Irish belief that an informant committed the worst kind of crime?
None of the witnesses ever saw Langdon and Kehoe together that evening. In addition,
the two men lived in the same neighborhood; Kehoe resided only 150 yards away on the opposite
side of the same street. Yet, Langdon claimed to not know who struck him and claimed it must
have been “five, six, or seven men.” If he knew Kehoe as well as he claimed, Langdon would
have known it was Kehoe who attacked him. Other witnesses like William R. Roberts stated they
barely saw anything. Roberts claimed he heard a commotion in the streets and the movement of
men. Immediately, he shut his window and put out his light in fear. He only knew Langdon was
the victim because he knew the sound of his voice.10 Roberts’ testimony demonstrated how
rampant violence and lawlessness in the anthracite region created a general atmosphere of fear.
Many in the Irish community thought it better to ignore the violence than to become an
informant. By the same token, even if they chose to turn to the police, at a time before the Coal
and Iron Police, Schuylkill County lacked law officials.
There was no evidence that Kehoe directly participated in the beating and one witness
stated he was not even present during the attack.11 Langdon was killed forty to fifty yards from
Williams’ Hotel in Girardville. Other witnesses claimed they saw Kehoe amongst a group of
men including John Campbell, John Chapman, Neil Dougherty, Columbus McGee, and Michael
McGee, all alleged Molly Maguires, outside the hotel the night of the murder. However, none
10

[York], Report of the Case of the Commonwealth v. John Kehoe, 96.
Shenandoah Herald, January 9-16, 1877; MJ, January 9-16, 1877; [York], Report of the Case of the
Commonwealth v. John Kehoe.
11
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definitively placed any of the men at the scene. While witness William Canvin could not identify
who had assaulted Langdon, he described for the court Langdon’s pitiful state after the beating:
“He was beaten very badly about the head and face. His mouth was cut on the upper lip - I don’t
know in what shape it was cut…his teeth were loose. He was cut all over around the head and
one of his ears was cut.” Canvin also made reference to the condition of his clothing claiming, “it
was all saturated with blood and his hair was all matted…he was flighty.”12
Furthermore, after the beating occurred, witnesses observed Langdon staggering to his
home just yards away from the crime scene where he died two days later in his bed. This factor
enabled the defense to create an alternative explanation for Langdon’s death, which was that
Langdon did not die directly from the attack, but as a result of the over-zealous treatment
administered by his doctor. Kehoe’s defense attempted to demonstrate that the doctor’s over-use
of stimulants caused a stroke, killing his patient. Also, even if Kehoe was present during the
attack, which he was not, his attorneys posited that the assault was spontaneous as opposed to
premeditated. Therefore, Kehoe was liable for second degree murder at worst. The testimonies
made it clear that the evening was too dark to see any of the attackers clearly. Many admitted
that all they heard were rocks being thrown and Langdon’s screams of, “Oh, don’t, oh, don’t.”
Above all, the Coal and Iron Police and the corrupt Pinkerton Detective Agency executed the
entire investigation instead of public authorities.13 Anthony Dimmick, the doctor who treated
Langdon, reported a great loss of blood and inflammation of the brain. He did not believe the
blows to the head that Langdon received to be mortal; by insinuating that disease had caused the

12

[York], Report of the Case of the Commonwealth v. John Kehoe, 73.
[York], Report of the Case of the Commonwealth v. John Kehoe; Kenny, Making Sense of the Molly
Maguires, 228.
13
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inflammation of the brain, the defense attempted to introduce reasonable doubt. Langdon’s body
was never autopsied and a coroner’s inquest was never done.
On January 16, 1877, the Pottsville jury found John Kehoe guilty of first degree murder.
Incredulously, historian Kevin Kenny concluded, “Conviction of second degree murder might
have been expected; but the verdict of guilty of murder in the first degree is, in retrospect at least,
quite remarkable.”14 Symbolizing the triumph of Gilded Age industrial capitalism over Molly
Maguireism and labor unionism—which the coal and railroad barons believed to be linked—
Kehoe was sentenced to be hanged on April 16, 1877. In the months between his trial and his
execution, Kehoe struggled for his life. The Supreme Court denied his appeal so he moved on to
the Pardons Board. Kehoe’s plea for clemency was brought before the court in Harrisburg on
April 10, 1878 where it seemed he had a chance. According to the Shenandoah Herald, “None of
the previous ‘Mollie’ cases brought before the Board of Pardons were nearly as completely
prepared as this, nor had they half the bottom to stand on that Kehoe’s case has.”15 Campbell and
Dougherty even submitted affidavits declaring that Kehoe took no part in the Langdon murder
and the theory presented by the defense that Langdon’s death was due to maltreatment from his
doctor started to gain ground. The Board tabled Kehoe’s appeal until September 2 when the
members turned it down despite the fact that Pennsylvania Governor Hartranft felt that the
evidence against Kehoe was lacking. He believed that Kehoe deserved punishment, but did not
deserve to be hanged for “a crime that he was not clearly proven guilty of merely because he has

14

[York], Report of the Case of the Commonwealth v. John Kehoe; Kenny, Making Sense of the Molly
Maguires, 228.
15
Marvin W. Schlegel, Ruler of the Reading: The Life of Franklin B. Gowen (Harrisburg: Archives
Publishing Co. of Pennsylvania, Inc., 1947), 148.
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been implicated in other dark deeds that, according to the law, would consign him to the
gallows.”16
Even after the failed appeal, Governor Hartranft hesitated to sign the death warrant.
Marvin Schlegel, writing in the 1940s, believed this was because Hartranft truly believed in
Kehoe’s innocence. The reality was much more selfish. The year 1878 was a gubernatorial
election year. Hartranft needed the Irish vote and therefore, stalled signing the warrant until after
his reelection. Despite the fact that Hartranft set Kehoe’s execution for December 18, Kehoe
continued to fight until the last breath. Kehoe demanded a third audience with the Board of
Pardons, this time armed with a written affidavit from Patrick McHugh which stated, as did all
the other affidavits, that Kehoe had not been present at Langdon’s beating. The Board considered
the evidence insufficient and John Kehoe was hanged on December 18, 1878.17
Under normal circumstances, a jury would have had difficulty reaching a guilty verdict at
the end of this trial. However, the atmosphere in Schuylkill County was far from normal during
this period. Before Kehoe was brought to trial, eighteen other highly publicized Molly Maguire
cases had occurred. Judge Pershing and the prosecution went to great lengths to convince the
jury that despite conflicting testimony, lack of evidence, and the inability to definitively place
Kehoe at the scene, Kehoe planned the murder in advance, and gave the orders for its execution.
Wayne Broehl, the first major Molly Maguire historian of the latter half of the nineteenth
century, wholeheartedly believed the prosecution. He argued that Kehoe was directly involved in
the Langdon murder based solely on the fact that Langdon oversaw many miners who were
members of the Kehoe family and that just three weeks prior to the murder, Langdon had docked

16
17

Schlegel, Ruler of the Reading, 148; Shenandoah Herald, July 10, 1878.
Schlegel, Ruler of the Reading, 149.
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Kehoe’s pay.18 As Broehl was the foremost Molly Maguire historian until Kevin Kenny wrote
his monograph in 1998, the general consensus for decades depicted John Kehoe as “King of the
Mollies”; he was unquestionably guilty and his organization was made up of into a murderous
group of thugs.
More recently, Kenny and his successor Mark Bulik analyze the Kehoe trial as well as the
other showcase trials between 1876 and 1879, during which twenty alleged Mollies were put to
death, within the larger context of critical nineteenth century tensions between labor and the
industrial aristocracy, between unionism and capitalism. This context made it clear that railroad
baron Franklin B. Gowen, and Charles Albright, a Civil War enemy of the Mollies, as well as
other members of the prosecution, saw the Kehoe trial as an opportunity to eliminate the “King
of the Mollies” and to connect the secret organization directly to unionism. During the trial,
Albright cross-examined James Shoveland, secretary of a miners’ union in 1862, and asked if
they called themselves the Buckshots, a synonym for the Molly Maguires. Shoveland refuted this
by saying, “The coal operators put that name on the union then.” Albright switched gears and
asked him if Kehoe had been a member of the union. Shoveland replied, “He must have been; he
was a miner.”19
Disagreements among historians over Kehoe’s innocence points to the changing and
contradictory views historians have held about Molly Maguireism—its existence, its origins, and
ultimately, as this thesis explores, its effects on labor activism and unionism in the anthracite
region of Pennsylvania.

18
19

Broehl, The Molly Maguires, 334.
McCarthy, The Great Molly Maguire Hoax, 130.
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This thesis does not intend to weigh in on the arguably exhausted debate over whether the
Molly Maguires were martyrs or murderous thugs. A focus on just the Molly Maguires neglects
the more important issue, raised by Aurand, of how and why workers took the initiative to
address their own grievances. This thesis examines the effect Molly Maguireism had on
unionism and labor in the coal mines of the anthracite region of Pennsylvania. Though some
historians like Kevin Kenny contend that the Molly Maguires and unionism were separate
phenomenon, my research suggests retributive justice and collective action closely connected
these two entities. The Molly Maguires and the fledgling unions, most notably, the
Workingmen’s Benevolent Association, fought for the same values just through different
methods. Where unionism valued organization as a means to improve life and labor in the
anthracite region, the Molly Maguires instead used violence as a means to achieve the same end.
In order to fully understand the depth to which unionism and Molly Maguireism were
interconnected, a distinction must be made between the Molly Maguire ideology and that of the
actual physical organization. Unions attempted to restructure the reward system of wages the
operators put in place by demanding increased wages, lowered supply costs, and restrictions on
the abusive practice of payroll deductions.20 Molly Maguireism transcended this system where
the unions of 1840-1875 failed. These ideological depictions of Molly Maguireism were
disseminated mainly through men like Benjamin Bannan and his Miners’ Journal and other local
and national newspapers, Franklin B. Gowen, president of the Philadelphia and Reading
Railroad, and contemporary historians writing immediately after the trials and executions.
None of the surviving evidence is neutral, nor does it feign to be so. Most source material
on the Molly Maguires is written by their enemies and detractors, thus requiring more
20

Aurand, From the Molly Maguires to the United Mine Workers, 64.
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ideological reading and abstract analysis. These contemporary sources sought to use Molly
Maguireism as a way to demonize a specific group of Irishmen who undoubtedly committed
violent acts and to explain the variety of social problems besetting the anthracite region in the
mid-nineteenth century. There is a gap between past reality and past representation that, once
understood, historians can gain insight into the society in which the Molly Maguires lived, even
though they provide little reliable evidence on the nature of the Molly Maguires themselves. By
examining these primary sources as instances of ideology instead of straightforward
representations of fact, one can attempt to answer the questions: how were the Molly Maguires
described by contemporaries? Why were they described that way? How did actors use Molly
Maguireism for their own power? And, less definitively, who were the Molly Maguires, what did
they do, and why?
In the 1850s and 1860s, the Miners’ Journal was the first media source to present the
Molly Maguires as a synonym for Irish social depravity, anti-republicanism, and an evil terrorist
conspiracy. During the Civil War, the terrorist conspiracy was adapted to early labor activism
and draft resistance. With the birth of the Workingmen’s Benevolent Association in 1868, it was
only natural that contemporary sources associated Molly Maguireism with unionism. This thesis
addresses the contemporary statements about the Molly Maguires, their ideological uses, and the
particular historical context in which they emerged within the newspapers, pamphlets, trial
records and local histories of the time as well as monographs like Alan Pinkerton’s The Molly
Maguires and the Detectives and F. P. Dewees’s history, The Molly Maguires. In any attempt to
write about labor history from the perspective of the laborer, we must treat the surviving
evidence with the skepticism it deserves.

19
What is in a Name? Agrarian Justice in Ireland: The Molly Maguires in Historiographical
and Historical Context
An understanding of pre-Famine peasant movements in Ireland allow for deeper
comprehension of the American Molly Maguire movement and the effect that Molly Maguireism
had on the anthracite region of Pennsylvania. Historians of the American Molly Maguires have
importantly traced their activities to earlier protest movements, and therefore have described
Molly Maguireism as a transnational movement. Early Molly historians like F. P. Dewees
writing immediately after the trials in 1877 and Anthony Bimba in the 1930s simply took their
evidence from James McParlan’s pre-investigative research in Ireland in the 1870s. Before Alan
Pinkerton unleashed McParlan upon the coal mines, he required McParlan to draw up a
preliminary report on the origins of the society in Ireland. McParlan’s seven-page memorandum
detailed the history of seventeenth and eighteenth century Ulster secret societies. His thesis
centered around the idea that members of these societies were Molly Maguires under different
names. Hence, these early histories represented the Molly Maguire story in America as a
phenomenon directly transplanted intact from Ireland.
More recently, however, historians have discussed the transnationalism of Molly
Maguireism in more nuanced ways. Wayne Broehl’s 1960s interpretation stood as one of the first
attempts to emphasize the Molly Maguires' transnational roots, but failed to separate the Irish
agrarian societies from their American counterparts. Broehl’s contemporary, Harold Aurand,
glossed over Irish agrarian protest portraying the Molly Maguires instead as a product of the
atmosphere of the Pennsylvania coal fields and therefore unique to Schuylkill County. Kevin
Kenny’s Making Sense of the Molly Maguires complicated previous accounts by describing
Molly Maguireism as a transnational movement, while separating the American Molly Maguires
from the Irish agrarian societies of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Finally, the

20
most recent Molly Maguire historian, Mark Bulik, augmented Kenny’s argument by further
connecting the American Mollies to Ireland through his examination of folk behaviors like
mummery, a sort of ancient play performed by amateur troupes adorning costumes and black
face who visited nearby homes during the Christmas season in Ireland.21 The American Mollies
certainly drew upon methods of protest from their ancestors, but the organization grew
organically from the Pennsylvania anthracite mines.
Historians argue that the tradition of Irish retributive justice originated in peasant protests
against Gaelic aristocracy and English rule in Ireland in the beginning of the eighteenth century.
Peasant farmers organized to combat Parliament’s decision in the 1750s to allow the sale of Irish
beef and butter in Britain which resulted in landlords evicting tenant farmers so they could graze
more cattle.22 One of the most famous movements and in this case, most relevant to American
Molly Maguireism, was the Whiteboy movements of the mid-eighteenth century. Whiteboyism
first appeared in the winter of 1761-1762 in the counties of Tipperary, Cork, Limerick, and
Waterford. Even though the Whiteboys led a primarily agrarian movement and the American
Mollies carried out their labor war in an industrial setting, the anthracite region of Pennsylvania
was far from an urban setting and therefore bore similarities to the Whiteboys and other agrarian
secret societies in Ireland, similarities that will be discussed further in Chapter Two. However,
while many early historians of the American Molly Maguires argued that they were descendants
of groups like the Whiteboys, Ribbonmen, and Defenders simply transplanted in America via
famine era immigration, these Old World secret societies exhibited stark differences in protest
method.
21

Mark Bulik, The Sons of Molly Maguire: The Irish Roots of America’s First Labor War (New York:
Fordham University Press, 2015), 28.
22
Bulik, The Sons of Molly Maguire, 47
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The Whiteboys’ activities appeared defensive in methodology and had two main
purposes. First, they sought to defend peasant interests against the aristocracy through persuasion
and intimidation; Whiteboys swore secret oaths and distributed threatening letters and notices,
similar to the oaths of the Ancient Order of Hibernians (AOH) and the coffin notices of the
American Mollies.23 In Ireland, Whiteboys issued coffin notices to landlords and other enemies
to warn them that if they did not make positive changes or leave their land, a crime would be
committed upon them. Coffin notices in America served the same purpose. The Mollies issued
them to superintendents, operators, or mine bosses as threats to suggest that if they did not leave
town or adhere to their wishes, they would wind up dead or some harm would come to their
property. Coffin notices also appeared in public spaces in the collieries, threatening miners on
strike, warning them not to return back to work before their needs were met. However, where the
Whiteboys’ letters had some semblance of legal verbiage, the American Mollies’ coffin notices
did not. Second, the Whiteboys, like the Molly Maguires in America, aimed to carry out punitive
measures against those who broke the “laws” thus established, resulting in widespread terror in
the region. At the heart of these laws, among both the Whiteboys and the American Mollies, was
the conviction that society was divided into “rich” and “poor.” The Whiteboys, as described by
historian Michael Beames, executed “punitive raids involving the destruction of property or the
beating of persons ‘obnoxious’ to them,” death being reserved for the worst of their landlords.24
Violent agrarian activity fluctuated with feast days and Gaelic holidays as well as the ups
and downs of the peasant economy. Mark Bulik details similarities between the Irish and
American Molly Maguires by pointing to a number of shared strategies with Irish mummers such
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as levying tribute, role-playing (dressing as women), visits to homes, blackmail, theft for food or
money, and collective action taken for the collective good with collective approval. Indeed, the
Molly Maguires in America shared some of these behaviors, but American Molly violence did
not adhere to feast days and holidays; to the American organization, the victims were more
important than when the violence occurred. However, the violent acts they organized in
Pennsylvania did coincide with the ever fluctuating anthracite economy and strike frequency.
Much of the Irish peasantry supported the Whiteboy movements. This support derived
mainly from a general class consciousness, or what Beames had called “peasant
consciousness.”25 Before Beames, who wrote in the 1980s, historians failed to credit the Irish
agrarian class with class consciousness. Other Molly Maguire historians like Dewees, Bimba,
and Broehl denied the Irish peasant secret societies their own historical agency. Until recently,
historians tended to discuss Irish agrarian violence in terms of a nationalist, Catholic populace
“struggling to cast off the yoke of the British, Protestant oppressor.”26 Historians like Beames
and later, Kenny, attempted to complicate this overly-simplistic portrayal by moving towards
more abstract concepts of Irishness and an emphasis on class consciousness and socioeconomic
relations. A collective peasant consciousness pushed back against two divisive issues in preFamine Ireland: strangers from other counties working in Whiteboy territory as laborers and
hostility towards landlords. Similarly, Irish immigrants in the Pennsylvania anthracite region
constantly feared encroachment upon their jobs and their wages, as meager as they were. Most
Irish in America became staunch Democrats and during and after the Civil War they tended to
take a pro-slavery, anti-black stance in fear of job competition from freed African Americans.
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Irish miners and laborers also exhibited a severe animosity towards mine owners, operators,
superintendents, and those in positions above them, viewing them as tyrants. Like the peasants
involved in pre-Famine movements, they refused to recognize the legitimacy of the established
order.
With the establishment of the Society of Ribbonmen in the nineteenth century, the term
Ribbonism also became a term used to describe rural violence. This society grew out from an
organization called the Defenders, active in south Ulster and contemporaries of the Whiteboys.
In contrast to the Whiteboys, the Ribbonism promoted anticlericalism. Historians have used the
terms Ribbonism and Molly Maguireism interchangeably, but the Irish Molly Maguires exhibited
methodology and motive more similar to agrarian Whiteboy activity even though contemporaries
of the time period and early Molly Maguire historians used Ribbonism to describe them. Kenny
described differences between the two societies: “The rural, local, and often Gaelic flavor of
agrarian agitators like the Molly Maguires….marked them off as very different from the secular,
cosmopolitan, and protonationalist Society of Ribbonmen.”27
The Whiteboys, Ribbonmen, and other Irish secret societies perceived themselves and
were perceived by their cohorts, as acting to defend of a traditional economy against the
emerging British market economy.28 In their attempts to achieve that cause, secret societies in
Ireland have been viewed by historians as either bloodthirsty and demonic or peaceful and
devout; in reality, they were both in that they employed violent and peaceful tactics to achieve
their ends. And like their counterparts in Ireland, the same duality characterized the Ancient
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Order of Hibernians and the Molly Maguires in America, organizations that were two sides of
the same coin.
The AOH was a society that originated in Ireland; the details of its origins remained
shrouded in mystery. According to an early-twentieth century history of the AOH in America,
branches of Ribbonmen organized themselves under names like the Hibernian Funeral Society
and St. Patrick’s Fraternal Society. These groups aimed to keep the Catholic Church at bay, as
the church adamantly preached against the existence and participation in secret societies.29 The
first appearance in America of the name Ancient Order of Hibernians was in 1838, when
Ribbonmen society members began a chapter of St. Patrick’s Fraternal Society in New York
City. These same members met with Ribbonmen in Schuylkill County to organize a new society.
Over the next two years, divisions sprung up in New York City and Schuylkill County that
eventually adopted the name Ancient Order of Hibernians.30 AOH headquarters remained in
Pennsylvania until the chapter in New York City acquired a charter in 1853.31 Branches were
also organized in Ireland, England, and Scotland. In his initial report to Alan Pinkerton, James
McParlan claimed the AOH and the Molly Maguires were imported from Ireland to America
where they conspiratorially established their organization in the coal mines of Pennsylvania. The
depiction of the AOH and the Molly Maguires as a foreign, rather than domestic, radical sect
tainted histories of the Mollies for decades. However, according to the official histories of the
AOH, no evidence existed that the organization was exported directly to America from Ireland.
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Historians have speculated about the origin of the name Molly Maguire. Until recently,
the origin story was based in Irish myth and lore. One version told of a group of local peasants
who organized to avenge an old widow named Molly Maguire after her British landlords evicted
her from her land. Another tells of a woman named Molly Maguire who owned an illegal tavern
where the first members of the secret society met to plan their violent activities. Yet another tale
portrays Molly Maguire as a “fierce, young woman, pistols strapped to each thigh, who led bands
of men through the countryside on their nocturnal raids.”32 Kenny presented William Steuert
Trench’s explanation as the most convincing of the Molly Maguire origin stories. Trench
observed that the Irish peasants who called themselves Mollies dressed in women’s clothing and
blackened their faces with burnt cork, similar to earlier groups like the Whiteboys. These men
claimed this mythical woman as the source of their origin because she symbolized their struggle
against injustice “whether sectarian, nationalist, or economic.” They saw themselves as a “son”
of Molly Maguire.33 The American Mollies never adorned women’s clothing, but they were
known for blackening their faces and performing their duty under the cover of night so as to
remain an anonymous force.
Conversely, Bulik offers a different origin story. He traces the Irish Mollies back to preFamine Ireland in the town of Ballinmuck where Catholic peasants took justice into their own
hands after Protestant tenants began dispossessing Catholics in an attempt to fix elections. As
part of this protest, a band of Ribbonmen murdered a Protestant farmer by the name of John
Brock within this environment. The community later attributed the murder to the Molly
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Maguires. Bulik argued that this incident must be understood in a symbolic sense “denoting
Ballinamuck as the birthplace of a new departure for the Ribbonmen.” Bulik separates himself
from Kenny by concluding that the Irish Molly Maguires were a subset of the Ballinmuck
Ribbonmen who later broke off to form their own society. Second, he presented another account
from William Steuart Trench, whose writings would be frequently cited during the American
Molly Maguire trials. Trench claimed that in May of 1843, a band of men who went by the name
Molly Maguire dressed in women’s clothing and with blackened faces assaulted a man serving a
federal notice to a Catholic tenant. Trench claimed that these men went by a different name,
Molly Maguire. Bulik, however, condemned Trench’s observations as literary and historical
fraud, arguing that there was no evidence of the term Molly Maguire in connection with agrarian
crime anywhere before 1844.34
Another debate among Molly Maguire historians as revolved around the very existence of
the organization. For example, Anthony Bimba, writing in the 1930s, sought to firmly establish
that the mine owners invented the Molly Maguires “in order to provide a convenient label for the
militant miners in the Pennsylvania anthracite fields.”35 He further asserted that the men who
were hanged for Molly crimes were simply victims of an anti-labor and nativist system created
by the impervious propaganda of the coal operators. He blamed his predecessors like F. P.
Dewees and Alan Pinkerton for characterizing the Molly Maguires as a group of desperate
criminals who forced other miners to participate in criminal acts. He noted that hey ignored the
basic class struggle and portrayed the Mollies as deserving of execution. However, Bimba’s
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depiction of the Molly Maguires as a fictitious propaganda ploy created by mine owners is an
oversimplification.
Historians have exhausted debates over the origin of the name Molly Maguire, the extent
to which the American manifestation was connected to earlier Irish iterations, and whether they
existed at all. While acknowledging the importance of this historiographical debate, historians
must move beyond this and focus on the extent to which the American Molly Maguires, in both
their real and imaginary form, affected unionism among Irish miners in Pennsylvania. A good
example of a scholar who moved beyond these debates, is labor historian Harold Aurand, who
set himself apart from his contemporaries like Broehl within the Molly Maguire historiography
by focusing primarily on the labor culture of the Pennsylvania coal region as opposed to focusing
specifically on the Molly Maguire saga. He placed the labor history and industry of the coal
region at the forefront and sought to situate the Molly Maguires in this broader context. Aurand
explored the unique identity and history of the coal region by delving into the creation of
industry wide unions that originated and died there. 36 As this thesis contents, the names of and
distinctions between, the various agrarian protest groups, while important, matter less than what
they all stood for: as both terror-inducing criminals and martyrs fighting for the peasant class,
they all served as a symbol of the peasant struggle in pre-Famine Ireland. This tradition of
retributive justice and collective action and the well known methods of previous secret societies
influenced the American Molly Maguires, although this did not make them all one and the same.
This thesis argues that to say that the American Mollies were the descendants, an imitation, or a
transplantation of their pre-Famine era counterparts is an oversimplification. They shared several
of the same methods and behaviors as the agrarian peasant societies, but the organization in the
36
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coal region grew out of the atmosphere created there by class, ethnic, and capitalist struggles
unique to mid-nineteenth century Pennsylvania.
For over one hundred years, Molly Maguire historians have debated the role the Mollies
played in America and more specifically Pennsylvanian labor history. Historians demonized the
Mollies during and immediately after the showcase trials and executions of 1876-1878 until the
early- and mid-twentieth century. Early apologists portrayed the Mollies as primitive terrorists,
Marxists and socialists saw them as labor martyrs, and Irish Americans saw them as victims of
the coal conspiracy. Owen Hunt, writing in the 1920s, emerged as a dissonant voice by declaring
Reading and Philadelphia Railroad President F. B. Gowen, his constituents, and the Pinkerton
detectives Gowen hired to infiltrate the miners’ union as the true villains in the Molly Maguire
saga. Mark Bulik, the most recent Molly Maguire historian argued that today, there is no
consensus amongst historians and therefore, many have separated themselves from the
arguments of these previous historians.
The Molly Maguires, both in their physical and imagined form, counted as key
protagonists in what the New York Times in the late-nineteenth century, and historians since,
called the “labor wars” between big business and unions of the Gilded Age. In the anthracite coal
fields of Pennsylvania, however, more local wars also occurred between workers, those like the
Mollies who wanted to use violence to encourage change, and others who instead sought to
peacefully organize and bargain collectively with their employers. Molly Maguireism existed
alongside unionism in the anthracite region from the beginning and the concentration of violence
attributed to the Molly Maguires ebbed and flowed with union progress. When union
development was at its weakest, the incidence of Molly violence increased. The Molly Maguires
and groups like them emerged out of the failure of unionism to give the miners the rights they

29
deserved. As Sydney Lens argued, the labor wars of the Gilded Age and Progressive Era were
characterized by “violence, bitterness, deception, illegality, immorality, and conflict.” Over time,
historians have characterized these violent conflicts as steps towards “friendly, organized
progress.”37 These labor wars, violent and sometimes bloody, shaped workingmen's condition
and the larger history of unionism. They also provided the context within which the Mollies
lived, worked, and protested. Indeed, Molly Maguireism, the Workingmen’s Benevolent
Association, and other labor organizations in Schuylkill County offer important local examples
of the broader nation-wide labor wars of the late-nineteenth century.
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CHAPTER 2
ANTHRACITE AND FIRST ATTEMPTS AT UNIONISATION, 1840s TO 1850s
It would be in Pennsylvania’s isolated coal country, rather than in more urban industries
in nearby cities like Philadelphia or New York, that Molly Maguireism would flourish. The coal
industry’s unique society, economy, and geography created an atmosphere of general violence
and unbridled unrest that more population-dense and policed urban areas rarely experienced. The
union movement also experienced less success in organizing the coal industry than it did in
industries centered in cities. Craftsmen and skilled laborers dominated early nineteenth century
urban, unions organized by trade rather than by industry. The interdependence of miners and
laborers inherent in the functional organization of work in the coal region, however, meant that
in the coal industry, collective action had to be made on an industry-wide basis. Organization of
work into functional operations created a status hierarchy for anthracite mine workers.38
Geographic and economic division within the coal industry and Pennsylvania anthracite region
further impeded collective action by workers, making the formation of an industry-wide union
close to impossible. In order to comprehend why Molly Maguireism rooted itself so strongly in
the Pennsylvania coal region and why unionism failed, an understanding of the characteristics
and inherent weaknesses of the coal industry must be established.

Black Gold: A Brief History of Pennsylvania Anthracite
Mine owner Abraham Pott funded and contracted the first railroad in Schuylkill County,
Pennsylvania in 1826. It connected his mine to the head of navigation at the mouth of Mill Creek
and extended only a half of a mile. A nineteenth century history of Schuylkill County described
38
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the railroad, “It had wooden rails and the cars running on it, carried each one and a half tons of
coal.”39 A forward-looking man and entrepreneurial thinker, Pott predicted the anthracite coal
industry would flourish and rail was the only way to transport the “black gold.” By the middle of
the nineteenth century, Philadelphia and Reading Railroad absorbed Pott’s railroad into its ever
expanding network across southern and central Pennsylvania. With the help of the railroads, the
anthracite coal fields expanded across seven counties: Schuylkill, Lebanon, Dauphin,
Northumberland, Columbia, Luzerne, and Carbon. One of the main coal fields, the Eastern
Middle Field, stretched into Schuylkill County and became the center for Molly activity.
Anthracite was first used in the 1830s to replace charcoal as fuel in the smelting process
of iron. Iron furnaces sprung up in Schuylkill County beginning with the Lehigh Coal and
Navigation company, built in Mauch Chunk (today Jim Thorpe) and Pioneer Furnace near
Pottsville. At first, miners dug the ore from outcroppings. Prototypical mines were rudimentary
pits that sunk from elevated positions from which miners hauled the coal above ground with a
windlass. Due to lack of technology and any method for water drainage, these first mines were
quickly abandoned after reaching thirty to forty feet.40 Later, the mineral was recommended for
household fuel because of its cheapness and by the 1840s anthracite became “a necessity for rich
and poor.”41 Anthracite coal became a nationally important and desired resource in the years
leading up to the American Civil War. The industry was a major employer in Pennsylvania and
provided fuel to the iron industry as well as for public consumption. Used more widely than
bituminous coal, anthracite played an integral part in the economic development of the nation
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and due to demand, the hard coal regions were among the first state areas to yield to corporate
domination.
As operators gained greater knowledge and capital, the methods of extracting coal
improved. They designed shafts located directly above the ore deposits. Miners and material
were hoisted in and out of the mine through the shaft. Much of the coal deposits laid below the
water level, which made accessing the fuel source difficult. As a solution, operators introduced
two kinds of mines: slopes and tunnels. Slopes drove from the surface to the coal or along a coal
seam. On the other hand, tunnels drove horizontally into the hillside. Tunnel mines essentially
connected shafts as they were driven at right angles into the hillside and intersected seams.42 In
order to solve the excess table water problem, operators learned to drain the water to the bottom
of the shaft and then pump or bring it up to the surface by hand. Once the Reading and
Philadelphia Railroad had effectively taken over Pennsylvania’s anthracite region, deep-shaft
mining became more popular. The methods used to extract coal from the mines depended on
pitch and thickness of the seam, the texture of the coal, and the pressure and composition of the
roof, walls, and floor. Although miners still practiced more primitive methods of extraction like
scraping and digging, the methods of pitch mining became more efficient.
The pitch mining method was more commonly used by the miners in the lower anthracite
fields of Schuylkill County, the world of the Molly Maguires. The most popular pitch technique
was chute mining, which involved driving a gangway near the bottom of the seam and driving a
timbered chute upward into the coal at an angle. Each chute contained batteries, or bulkheads,
which allowed the miner to have control over the release of the loose coal that he had mined
from the face above. A laborer opened the battery occasionally to allow the coal to fall to a car
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waiting below. The coal dust that flooded the gangway below was so thick, the laborer who
loaded the car could only see a few feet in front of him. In order to check that the car was full, he
needed to dangle his feet down from the chute and measure by the touch of his feet.43
The Southern Coal Field, where Molly Maguireism was most prevalent, contained more
than three thousand foot deep, steeply pitched seams that in some cases tilted at a ninety degree
angle. This exceptionally dangerous type of mining laid the groundwork for future battles over
mine safety measures with Pennsylvania legislatures for mine safety measures, one of the many
anthems of the Mollies and their fellow workingmen.

Labor Hierarchy and Challenges to Economic Mobility
The anthracite regions underwent rapid industrialization starting in the mid nineteenth
century and absorbed nearly ever major ethnic group; thus, the Pennsylvania coal region
represented a microcosm of broader economic and social processes affecting the entire nation.
While paralleling trends in other parts of the country, the Pennsylvania anthracite regions
developed a unique identity.44 The anthracite region was divided into two socially,
geographically, and economically different locations: the upper anthracite region consisting of
the Northern and Eastern Middle coal beds, and the lower anthracite region consisting of the
Western Middle and Southern coal beds. The lower coal fields lacked the economic
infrastructure of the upper fields, which possessed more large-scale corporations allowing for
deeper shafts, massive breakers, and the extensive operations necessary for gaining access to
deep lying coal. The Delaware & Hudson Canal, the Delaware, Lackawanna & Western
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Railroad, and the Lehigh Coal & Navigation Company dominated the industry in the upper fields
and fed their product to New York rather than Pennsylvania. However, by 1851, the major
mining companies in the upper fields sought expansion into eastern markets; this threatened to
monopolize trade and leave Schuylkill County, which traditionally supplied Pennsylvania,
without its customers.45
The more stable mining environment of the upper fields, which included safer working
conditions and better pay for miners, allowed employers to more easily discipline and control
their workers; this stability discouraged unionism from becoming industry wide and Molly
Maguireism from acquiring a tight grip. Conversely, the unstable nature of lower field coal
extraction and production characterized by volatility, unsafe working conditions, an
undisciplined labor force, and very low pay, produced an environment ripe for the development
of trade unionism and Molly Maguireism.46
Working conditions above and below ground in the lower fields of Schuylkill County
were terrible by modern standards. Aside from child labor, operators and superintendents
employed corporate punishment. The mines also lacked light and safety precautions. Deaths and
injuries were prevalent. Due to frequent suspensions caused by overproduction, the mines
became idle for long periods of time producing poor ventilation, stagnant water, standing gas,
and decay of timber in the shafts. Irregular employment explains in part why the wages of
anthracite workers were much lower than those for workers in other major industries during the
mid-nineteenth century. Workers in steel mills across the mid-Atlantic were also paid a higher
wage.

45
46

Munsell, History of Schuylkill County, 38.
Kenny, Making Sense of the Molly Maguires, 49.

35
The inherent weaknesses of the anthracite industry explain in part the poor wages and
working conditions. And it was these weaknesses that would inspire and allow for collective
action by workers. Historians of Ireland have already demonstrated that collective action among
Irish peasants in Ireland proved effective in pushing back against English rule.47 Similarly, in
America during the labor wars, laborers from different ethnic backgrounds found that collective
action was the laborers’ most effective strategy for effecting change.
Success and failure of unionism in the coal region depended on the unions’ ability to
come to terms with the mine workers’ environment. Coal mining was back breaking and labor
intensive, effectively immune to the technological improvements of other industries. The
difficulty of introducing machinery to the mines gave workers a sense of job security, but it also
produced a somewhat rigid labor hierarchy.48 The contract miners, mostly English and Welsh
immigrants paid by the piece, stood at the top of the anthracite pyramid. The day miners,
working for definite wages, ranked directly below. Highly skilled employees were underneath
the day miners, and the unskilled laborers at the bottom. The Molly Maguires and a majority of
their fellow Irish migrants fell into this bottom category. However, this hierarchy was not
completely immutable. Some unskilled laborers made the transition to skilled employee. Also,
as historian Harold Aurand argued, skilled laborers could move laterally, “from one occupation
to another regardless of change in status or in geographical position.”49 Indeed, the nature of the
anthracite mining industry relied on the geographic mobility of workingmen. Operators
depended on an imported and transient labor force due to the relatively isolated location of coal
in Pennsylvania. And yet, because mining companies owned or controlled most of the land,
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miners rarely had the opportunity of purchasing their own house and land. Had they had access
to land ownership and property, immigrant miners may have been more invested in the
community and hence, more likely to stay. Because the mining industry completely dominated
the area, the only way to get out of the industry was to leave the anthracite region. Immigrant
miners who did leave went one of two ways: back to the “Old World” or out West. While
geographical mobility was common, socio-economic mobility for new immigrant miners proved
more complicated. Higher positions in the mining industry such as foreman or superintendent
required skills, capital, and education that made these positions less accessible to Irish and other
immigrant miners and laborers and the mainly English and Welsh men who held those privileged
positions labored hard to keep them in their hands. With the exception of changing his
occupation, a miner remained limited in terms of upward mobility and opportunity.
Contract miners had the most independence and more control over the production process
in addition to being the best paid the most within the tiered system. They earned wages
depending on the amount of coal they produced as opposed to a daily wage. Operators measured
production by carload or weight of each car. Therefore, it proved easy for operators and super
intendants to claim more slate in the coal than it actually contained, a strategy called “short
weighing.” In some of the coal region, companies paid miners by the yard, meaning they were
given wages according to the rate at which they advanced into the ore seam. Miners, contracted
or otherwise, hired the unskilled laborers, making them subject to the miners, rather than to the
colliery owners or superintendents. Once contract miners were done for the day, they had the
ability to leave the colliery, and their hired laborers remained to shovel coal into cars for
transport and bring them to the surface and pile waste to one side. Operators never employed
women in the mines, but children were not off limits. Three thousand nine hundred eighty boys
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worked in the mines of Schuylkill County in 1870; almost a quarter of them worked below
ground, in charge of mules and ventilation, with the rest remaining above ground to pick slate
out of the coal in the breakers.50
In addition to the economic differences, the geographic layout of the anthracite region
and specifically Schuylkill County allowed for Molly Maguireism to take hold. Hills and
mountains separated the county in half effectively leaving northern Schuylkill County isolated.
This region suffered from general violence and crime as well as from intense Molly activity after
1870. During the mid-nineteenth century, violence did occur in urbanized settings, but such
violence took on a different form. Cities like Philadelphia or New York employed large police
forces that largely prevented Molly Maguireism or similar groups from permeating the
community. As historians such as Kevin Kenny and Mark Bulk have argued, the unique
landscape and economic circumstances of the lower anthracite fields largely imitated the
environment of the eighteenth century Irish countryside.
Pottsville, laid out by John Pott, functioned as the county seat for Schuylkill county. The
population of Pottsville rose from 2,464 in 1830 to 12,384 in 1870, as it evolved into the
economic center for the lower anthracite industry as well as the iron and steel industry. Pottsville
also boasted the development of the first newspaper for the mining community, the Miners’
Journal, established by George Taylor in 1825. Other cities in Schuylkill county grew in a
similar manner and a similar time frame. The county’s population reached 116,428 by 1870 and
by that year, 30,856 of residents were foreign born. As in other areas with high concentrations of
the foreign born workers, forty percent of Schuylkill’s immigrant population was Irish and
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inhabited mostly the mining districts.51 This large number and concentration of Irish Catholics in
Schuylkill County allowed Irish immigrants to retain many elements of their folk culture. Gaelic
served as the first language for many Famine-era Irish migrants into the late 1870s. Irish
migrants preferred the communal life they were accustomed to from back home and therefore,
settled primarily in the rural or semi-rural townships or “patches” clustered around the collieries.
Welsh-, English-, and American-born miners dominated the more urbanized towns such as
Pottsville, Tamaqua, or Minersville. This ethnic separation exacerbated class and ethnic
stratification already put in place by mining management.
Mine operators in Schuylkill county used their economic and political influence to
implement an industry-community relationship dominated by the mining and railroad industries.
Local businessmen needed the mines to survive and the mines could not operate without the
community that surrounded them. This mutual dependency was especially prevalent due to
Schuylkill County’s geographic isolation. Coal mines and mining settlements were
geographically fixed by the mineral’s location which in turn, functioned as the only source of
employment for inhabitants. Aware of this control, operators believed they acted as masters of
the industry’s and community’s future. Operators consolidated their control by owning the land
where their collieries stood, which allowed them to pick and choose who could and could not
live there, evicting “undesirables” and refusing entry to those they did not like. In this way, the
coal “patch” resembled, as Bulik put it, a feudal fief.52 As in other mining regions in the West
and Southwest, in Schuylkill county, the mining companies were omnipresent in miners’ lives;
they owned the mines, the land, the streets, and usually the workers’ houses. Miners could only
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purchase goods for their occupation and their lives in company stores. Miners received pay in
script or store orders which could be traded in for cash at a discounted change-over rate or used
to buy shoddy company store goods at inflated prices.53 These corporate towns proved very
different from the more economically diverse “free towns” in the Pennsylvania coal region. In
these “free towns,” the majority of the male population worked in the mines; however, the
existence of other industries and businesses beyond the coal companies created a more
heterogeneous class structure that allowed members of the community to explore other economic
pursuits.
Historians have painted a picture of the coal industry in corporate towns as an
overarching monolith of economic, social, and political power that controlled the lives of the
community they encompassed. This was certainly true in the case of Schuylkill county.
Attorneys on the railroad company’s payroll protected the companies’ interests. For example, M.
E. Olmsted, a Harrisburg lobbyist for the anthracite industry, possessed great influence over the
governor of Pennsylvania and its legislature.54 Another example was Franklin B. Gowen who
became the district attorney for Schuylkill County before achieving the presidency of the
Philadelphia and Reading Railroad. However, this portrayal of the coal industry as a political and
economic hegemon leaves little room for recognizing the agency of the miners and laborers
themselves.
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Early Attempts in Trade Unionism, 1842-1860

The year 1842 signaled an upswing in the American economy after a long depression that
began in 1837. During this period of recovery, the labor movement nationwide took a step
towards solidarity. A movement in support of a ten-hour work week took hold in several
industries in the United States. The movement did not result in solid legislation until the 1850s,
but remained strong throughout the decade. The American workers’ movement was not gradual
and progressive, but a sporadic and fierce struggle, interrupted frequently and often just when the
workingmen seemed to gain ground. These interruptions compelled the workers’ movement to
constantly reassess the situation, their gains and losses, and begin their battles once again.55
When the Reading and Philadelphia Railroad reached completion in 1842, a rivalry over
coal transportation ensued between the railroad and canal industry. As a result, competitors
slashed rates for the transportation of coal and the mining companies cut prices; this had the
effect of glutting the market. Lower coal prices meant lower wages for workers as well as partial
employment. In some cases operators ceased to pay their workers in cash, instead playing
workers in kind with goods from the company store. Operators made agreements with store
owners for advanced credit, against which they wrote orders for merchandise. Operators
redeemed these orders as soon as they received cash for their coal. Wages went from six dollars
to five dollars and twenty-five cents a week for miners, and four dollars and twenty cents for
laborers. Anthracite workers in Minersville, a borough in Schuylkill County, struck that July to
protest the store-order system and to demand higher wages. District Attorney Francis W. Hughes
initiated the formation of a committee to come together and take down the workers’ grievances.
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However, despite Hughes’ actions, the operators refused to recognize the organization, forcing
the dejected workers back to the mines. These main grievances that caused the strike of 1842—
low pay and poor working conditions—motivated subsequent strikes in the coal fields.
As the ten-hour movement ran its course, a more prominent movement began, a nationwide movement to reform industrial capitalism by turning production into a more cooperative
enterprise through the unionization of industries. For example, in 1849 miners and laborers
formed the Bates Union under labor leader John Bates. Bates’s solution to keeping wages high
was to raise the price of coal by controlling the amount supplied to the market through
suspension of operations.56 On May 2, the day work was set to resume, more than two thousand
miners met in Minersville, the site of the strike of 1842, and passed a resolution impressing
“upon the miners and laborers of Schuylkill County the importance of unanimous, firm,
determined, but at the same time mild and respectful action.” They recommended, “the
appointment of a committee of two from each colliery to form a central committee to make the
necessary arrangements for the formation of a miners’ union if they shall deem it necessary, and
also to negotiate with employers.”57 The miners struck on July 4, 1849 and passed several
resolutions that introduced a new theme that would occur in subsequent strikes in anthracite
region: that their interests “and the interests of [their] employers are so connected and identified
that it would be impossible to separate them.”58 Unfortunately, the goals of the labor leaders and
those of the workingmen clashed as bands of miners traveled from colliery to colliery
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brandishing weapons, threatening non-striking miners to cease work and join the cause.59 As fate
had it, the Bates Union collapsed shortly after the strike as rumor spread that John Bates had
embezzled money from the treasury.60
The movement toward unionism in Schuylkill County saw a second major setback during
the Panic of 1857 when mine workers went on strike in Ashland in 1858 to demand higher
wages. This strike was notable for two reasons. First, it was the first instance of labor violence
where Molly Maguireism was involved. Strike leaders urged workers to avoid employing any
violence, “not to get drunk, bellow, make threats, give insults, stop those who wish to work from
doing so, annoy persons, or other things unlawful.”61 Despite this warning, notices appeared
outside collieries complete with images of coffins and pistols, common in Molly coffin notices,
warning miners of dire consequences if they did not stop working.62 Second, the strike of 1858
set a precedent for the use of military force to put down labor disputes in the anthracite region.
On May 21, after strikers paraded through the town of St. Clair, shutting down collieries as they
went, the sheriff decided to mobilize an entire militia unit consisting of one artillery company
and one cavalry company. The regiment marched to St. Clair, arrested five labor leaders, four of
which were convicted, and three of which were sentenced to sixty days in prison.63
***
Privileging a transnational perspective, historian Kevin Kenny put forth that these preCivil War strikes and early efforts at unionism in the anthracite region reflected anti-British
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“modes of intimidatory action derived from the Irish countryside.”64 As proof he shows that
many of the Irish who settled in the part of Schuylkill County where labor organization was most
present, arrived from the Kilkenny and Castlecomer regions of Ireland that boasted some of the
only workable coal mines in the country. The intimidatory actions of posting coffin notices did
derive inspiration from eighteenth century Irish agrarian justice; however, Kenny neglects to
acknowledge that while Irish workers’ actions were informed by their pre-migration experiences,
the reasons for the strikes and attempts at unionism in Pennsylvania grew organically out of the
specific social, economic, geographical characteristics of the region’s coal industry. After the
Panic of 1857, the Pennsylvania coal fields were fraught with constant striking, labor unrest,
unemployment, and widespread hunger. In many ways indeed, Schuylkill County resembled the
Old World that Irish migrants had left behind; in both, Irish workers experienced religious
bigotry in the form of anti-Catholicism and a militarized force that threatened miners’ ability to
advance themselves through collective action. The looming threat of the militia, and in the
coming decades, the company-controlled Coal and Iron Police, taught mine workers that in order
to succeed, strikes would have to be “run from the shadows by men ready to use violence.”65 As
we shall see in the proceeding chapters, the Molly Maguires represented this precise mindset.
They believed that the AOH, unionism, and other methods of collective action employed by the
AOH and unionism failed to improve the livelihoods of their fellow Irishmen and miners and
therefore, decided to take matters into their own hands.
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CHAPTER 3
THE FIRST WAVE: THE GROWTH OF MOLLY MAGUIREISM AND UNIONISM
DURING AND IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE CIVIL WAR
The name “Molly Maguire” appeared in print for the first time in 1857. Benjamin
Bannan, editor of the Miners’ Journal, the region’s leading newspaper, complained about the
political nature of the St. Patrick’s Day speeches in reference to the Hibernian Society made by
Democrat Francis Hughes that year. Bannan further suggested that St. Patrick’s Day celebrations
were degenerating due to “party matters and philippics.”66 Then in October of 1857, Bannan
wrote, “The Molly Maguires - A new and exclusively Catholic secret organization…has recently
sprung up in our Eastern cities.”67
Benjamin Bannan was born in Berks County Pennsylvania in 1807 to a Welsh farming
family of middling means. As a young man, he was an apprentice to a printer until 1829 when he
relocated to the lower anthracite region of Schuylkill County. Bannan purchased the Miners’
Journal and served as its editor for the next forty years. Under Bannan, the Journal evolved into
the leading Whig, nativist, and Republican publication in the predominantly Democratic lower
anthracite region. Upon its pages, he spilled his anti-Catholic ideology and a vision of America,
characterized by “honest, productive work and its social rewards, a strong conviction that a
virtuous citizenry was impossible without social mobility and the possibility of economic
independence for all, and a related emphasis on the harmony of interests between labor and
capital.”68 The journal’s promotion of class harmony and its belief in the possibility of economic
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mobility made it a publication that represented the economically more secure small operating
class, rather than the interests of the mine workers and trade union movement.69
Bannan used his paper to espouse his idea of an ideal labor society in which unskilled
workers moved up the labor hierarchy to become skilled miners, small operators, and property
owners, and in which a large middle class of small-scale entrepreneurs dominated the economy,
rather than a few powerful corporations.70 However, the presence of a large number of unskilled
Irish laborers, who never seemed to be able to move up the social hierarchy, shook Bannan’s
ideal society to the core. To Bannan, the Irish symbolized “the prospect of a permanent, laboring
class, morally depraved, socially dependent, and a blight on his cherished republican polity.”71
What Bannan and other nativists overlooked was the reality that a miner, regardless of his
ethnicity, rarely rose above his station. The majority of Irish could not hope to achieve any
occupation above that of laborer let alone be upwardly mobile and possess land; blind to this
reality, Bannan attacked the Irish and every aspect of their livelihood including their religion,
their culture, their ways of working, and their drinking practices.72
In 1857, much to Bannan’s dismay, Democrat William Packer defeated Republican
David Wilmot for Governor of Pennsylvania and Democrats were elected to most local offices in
Schuylkill County. This political clean sweep led to Bannan’s first printed mention of the idea
that a secret society was active in the anthracite region. He became obsessed with this theory
throughout the 1860s and 1870s, and Bannan used it to accuse Irish Catholics of political
corruption. Because the Irish habitually bloc voted, Bannan declared Democratic victories as
69

Kenny, “The Political Odyssey of Benjamin Bannan,” 330.
Clifton K. Yearley, Enterprise and Anthracite: Economics and Democracy in Schuylkill County, 18201875 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1961), 57-92.
71
Kenny, “The Political Odyssey of Benjamin Bannan,” 334.
72
Kenny, “The Political Odyssey of Benjamin Bannan,” 331.
70

46
electoral fraud; the puppeteers behind this fraud, he claimed in the October 3, 1857 edition of the
Miners’ Journal, was a group he called “the Molly Maguires.” Thus Molly Maguireism was
born, and in Bannan’s hands, it became associated with local, Democratic political conspiracies.
Bannan also proved instrumental in linking the Molly Maguires to organized patterns of
violence.
In his role as president of the Pennsylvania and Reading Railroad, Franklin B. Gowen
acted as a second catalytic individual in the evolution of Molly Maguireism. In order to
understand the effect Gowen had on Molly Maguireism, his familial and political background
must be explored. Franklin Gowen was born in 1836 in Lancaster County, Pennsylvania. In
1852, he and his brother Thomas decided to devote all their attention to the coal trade. At
nineteen, he relocated to the coal town of Shamokin to manage an iron furnace. Gowen partnered
with J. G. Turner as co-operators of a colliery in Mount Laffee in 1858. The mine failed a year
later, and Gowen decided to shift his career in the direction of law. By 1860, he was elected to
the Schuylkill County bar and became increasingly involved in Democratic politics. In the
election of 1862, Gowen ran on the Democratic ticket for district attorney of Schuylkill County
and won.73 By the end of the Civil War, after his feeble attempt at a private practice, Gowen took
on the role of representing the Reading Railroad in 1864, a role that later allowed him to build a
monopoly in coal production in the southern coal fields.74 Where Bannan had the media, Gowen
used his legal prowess as well as his presidency as a vehicle to spread Molly Maguireism and
unknowingly perpetuate its influence on unionism in the coal fields.
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Molly Maguireism and Unionism during the Civil War
After Confederate forces fired on Fort Sumter in April 1861, President Abraham Lincoln
immediately called for 75,000 volunteer troops. The initial response from the anthracite region
was enthusiastic. By April 25, Schuylkill County men made up twenty two companies who had
made their way to Washington DC.75 In regards to the evolution of Molly Maguireism in the
anthracite region, the American Civil War functioned as a major turning point. Irish violence
developed into a collective force for the first time in light of the subsequent draft riots.
Furthermore, with the help of Benjamin Bannan and his Miners’ Journal, the term Molly
Maguire became synonymous with murder and conspiracy. The Civil War era also saw Franklin
Gowen take hold of the presidency of the Pennsylvania and Reading Railroad, which gave him
the power to spark an industrial monopoly, igniting a battle between workingmen and the mining
aristocracy. This battle would end in a fierce industry-wide strike and the hanging of twenty
men.
In a broader sense, the Civil War transformed the economy of the Pennsylvania anthracite
region. At the beginning of the war, that transformation was not for the better. The first years of
the war crippled the anthracite industry. After the call for troops in 1861, mine work was delayed
or halted altogether as laborers left work to enlist in the Union army. The demand for coal also
lessened due to a general recession. However, by the second year of the war, the coal industry
underwent a boom time as a result of the government’s wartime need for anthracite. As demand
increased, so too did the wages of miners. In tight juxtaposition with wartime demand, wages for
miners also rose. In Schuylkill County, laborers who made $6 a week in the first year of the war,
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made $12 in 1862. Miners’ wages rose from $7.50 to $18 per week and contract miners’ wages
went from $12 to $30 a week.76
The Civil War also led to centralization of the lower coal region. Large coal companies in
New York and Philadelphia took control of production and the Reading Railroad bought out
smaller Schuylkill County railroads and took command of distribution.77 In a way, the increased
demand for coal and shift toward centralization during the war opened the door for men like
Gowen to achieve a near monopoly of production and distribution of Schuylkill County coal.
Much like urban tycoons such as J. P. Morgan, Andrew Carnegie, and Cornelius Vanderbilt,
Franklin B. Gowen stood as a symbol the American industrial elite in the anthracite region of
Pennsylvania. He represented corporate power in an area that prided itself in small operation and
inter-industrial competition.
Amidst this economic growth, ethnic and political unrest reared its ugly head. This was
partially due to the influx of foreign laborers, mostly Irish, who arrived to fill the employment
gaps made by enlistment and the following draft. Given the already deep-seated nativism in the
region, this influx of Irish workers also dredged up fears of Democratic, antiwar sentiment. Irish
immigrants were well known for their support of the Democratic party and despite a Republican
victory in the 1860 election in Schuylkill County, the anthracite region remained a Democratic
stronghold during the Civil War.78 The Democratic Party relied on the Irish miners for support,
but this backfired when party officials found their largest voter pool expressing widespread
antagonism toward the war. The county-wide enthusiasm that existed in the first year of the war
devolved into disenchantment by mid-1862. Authorities in Washington realized that they could
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not maintain the needed amount of manpower with voluntary enlistment stimulated by cash
bounties alone. President Lincoln and his cabinet concluded that the answer was conscription. In
August 1862, Lincoln ordered a draft of 300,000 militiamen. How the country was to come up
with the allotted amount of troops depended upon each state’s chosen method.79 In Pennsylvania,
the state legislature called for a census of each household which allowed for a quota to be set for
each county. County quotas could only be reduced if the county had previously produced
substantial enlistments.
The Democratic resurgence in Schuylkill County was not a complete victory in that
Benjamin Bannan and his newspaper still had strong control over Republicans with access to a
network of political power “that extended through the state and national levels and could be
supplemented by military force if necessary.”80 The state mobilized national forces to suppress
draft violence in Schuylkill County and created a precedent for future labor violence in the area.
For example, Cass township, the most Irish township of Schuylkill County, became the center of
“draft resistance, labor activism, and Molly Maguire activity during and immediately after the
Civil War.”81
Enlistments in Schuylkill County fell below the expected quota. Bannan, the appointed
local commissioner of the draft, commented, “All through the County these propagandists of
mischief have secretly urged men not to go to fight in an abolition war.”82 When the list of
conscripts was revealed, anti-war feelings exploded. Large mobs of men collectively made their

79

Broehl, The Molly Maguires, 87.
Kenny, Making Sense of the Molly Maguires, 84.
81
Electoral Returns from William A. Gudelunas Jr. and William G. Shade, Before the Molly Maguires:
The Emergence of the Ethno-Religious Factor in the Politics of the Lower Anthracite Region, 1844-1872
(New York: Arno Press, 1976), 81, 85, 133. As quoted in Kevin Kenny, Making Sense of the Molly
Maguires, 84.
82
MJ, April 9, 1862.
80

50
way from coal patch to coal patch recruiting miners to join their ranks and quit work in the
collieries. They were said to first have visited a liquor store in the town of Swatara, a part of
Cass township, armed with guns, and held up the store owner. Leaving the “proprietor high and
dry,” they drank liquor stolen from the store and after carousing about for a length of time, the
men decided to stop a train filled with Union army recruits. “Those who want to go can,”
Bannan’s Miners’ Journal quoted the mob leaders as saying, “but we will protect those who
don’t.”83
Benjamin Bannan informed Andrew Curtin, Republican governor of Pennsylvania, of the
unruly mob incident in Cass township. The governor turned to the then Secretary of War, Edwin
Stanton for aid. Stanton authorized the use of regular troops to enforce the draft in Schuylkill
County. However, after his initial overzealous cry for help, Governor Curtin back pedaled. He
felt that the draft resistance ran deeper than just simply collective antipathy for the war. “We all
think that the resistance to draft is the first appearance of a conspiracy, and unless crushed at
once, cannot say how far it may extend. We know there are 5,000 men in the league in three
counties, and all work is interrupted by them. I do not wish to magnify, and hope I am not
alarmed.”84 Curtin realized that bringing Union troops into the fray would only increase the
miners’ hatred of the war and the military and perhaps further provoke the rioters. But President
Lincoln and Secretary Stanton worried about the implications of an insurrection and so they
agreed to send the Anderson Cavalry led by General Wool to keep the draft running smoothly in
Schuylkill County. Frustrated, Curtin telegraphed President Lincoln directly and expressed his
fear that the cavalry would incense the demonstrators. Bannan also got involved in the situation,
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writing that he desired “a peaceful solution of the problem, and he said that the draft could not be
executed in Cass Township without bloody conflict with the Molly Maguires, and he could
conceive of no method by which there could be given the appearance of executing the law.” The
governor and draft officer Colonel McClure finally decided to get volunteers from other
townships to enlist through Cass Township in order for the area to meet its quota without inciting
more riots. As proof, Bannan presented affidavits executed before a justice of the peace in
Harrisburg showing that the quota of Cass Township had been met. Neither Bannan, nor Colonel
McClure asked where these affidavits came from. “The law appeared to be executed, although
the affidavits were fictitious,” stated McClure. He continued, “it was an imperious necessity to
avoid conflict between the Molly Maguires and the troops.” With that, the troops were ordered
back to Pottsville.85 Mine operators’ and local officials’ reliance on military might to put down
local draft violence in the anthracite region set a precedent for the use of federal force in the
future. After the war, rather than use that force to deal with draft resistance, it would instead be
used to suppress laborers’ attempts to unionize.
Long opposed to secret, oath-bound societies, the Catholic Church made its voice heard
in regards to draft resistance in Schuylkill County. On behalf of the Church, Bishop James Wood
of the archdiocese of Philadelphia travelled to Pottsville in 1862 and urged compliance with the
draft. On January 19, he issued a pastoral letter that condemned the “Buckshots” and the “Molly
Maguires,” and declared that his letter should be read from the pulpit of every local Catholic
church in the region.86 This letter foreshadowed an excommunication that the soon-to-be
archbishop would issue twelve years later. At the same time, the coal mining barons wielded
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their economic power. Many military arrests were made in the name of draft resistance, but the
underlying goal was more likely to get rid of the alleged Molly Maguires in their midst. A
standing military presence proved so successful in preventing draft resistance that the
government used it elsewhere where draft resistance was prevalent, most famously, in New York
City in 1863. However, the operators did not predict the fact that the military presence inhibited
mines from recruiting the employees needed to make up for the labor shortage.87
While the Civil War triggered ethnic and political dissension, it also brought temporary
social unity. The labor shortage gave workers leverage in labor disputes for the latter three years
of the war. For example, miners of the Western Branch mine began to move towards more
sophisticated means of advancing their economic interests. The Civil War saw the formation of
regular labor organizations that used selective strikes as a central strategy. Miners established an
infant union called the Union Benevolent Society in 1860 which stood as the prototype for the
Workingmen’s Benevolent Association, an association that would come to play an important role
in labor unionism in Schuylkill County. In May 1862, 1,500 miners of the Heckscherville
colliery went on strike to fight for a ten cent pay increase per wagon-load for miners and a
twenty-five cent increase for laborers. The strikers also protested the high company store prices.
The Philadelphia Inquirer pointed out the complications this strike had on the war effort.
Anthracite fueled navy warships ordered to blockade the Confederate coast. “The affair is much
more important than it first appears, from the fact that the supply of coal to the government will
be stopped; and that, if the strikers succeed in their demands, the operators in that region may be
compelled to pay higher rates than the government contracts will allow.”88 In 1864, a
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“disinterested observer” wrote in to the Miners’ Journal surmising that the union was a disguise
for the Molly Maguires. These radical union workers, the observer argued, strove to “prevent
emigration from one colliery to another, to restrict the energy and industry for the respectable
foreigner who refused to cooperate; to secure labor for themselves; to regulate the cost of labor;
to dictate the price of mining; and to control the operations of each colliery.”89
One month after the Heckscherville strike, in the midst of increased labor militancy, a
violent crime occurred that defined the history of the Molly Maguires and Molly Maguireism
forever. Foreman Frank Langdon attended a meeting in Audenreid, a town on the SchuylkillCarbon County line, to plan the local Independence day celebration for that year. The tavern
where the meeting took place was crowded with men who were drinking and expressing
antigovernment sentiments. As Langdon walked home that night, men from the tavern attacked
him with sticks and stones. After undergoing home treatment from his personal doctor, Langdon
died the next day.90 Most Molly Maguire historians have declared this incident to be the first
murder committed by the Pennsylvania Mollies. However, Mark Bulik, the Molly’s most recent
historian, refused to believe this theory and asserted that “it was clearly a drunken crime of
opportunity, not cold, calculated murder.” He furthered his argument by denoting, “sticks and
stones were not the weapons of choice for Molly assassins.”91 Years after the crime, the courts
found John Kehoe guilty of the murder, even though his trial lacked credible witnesses and the
prosecution presented contradicting evidence. However, Bulik focused on exonerating Kehoe,
rather than using his evidence to also divorce the Langdon murder from the Molly Maguires.
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In his newspaper, Bannan continued to blame the draft violence on the Molly Maguires.
By the end of 1862, it appeared some unidentified group of miners finally embraced the moniker.
On December 5 of that year, a group of men seized an engine house at two Wolf Creek collieries.
They left threatening notes illustrated with coffins and drawings of skull and crossbones—the
first appearance of coffin notices, signed most poignantly, “Brave Sons of Molly.” The following
day, four hundred employees went on strike and a settlement was reached on December 10.92
Bannan used Wolf Creek and other incidents like it as fodder to insinuate that the same men
were responsible for the anti-conscription movements. As a result of Bannan’s constant depiction
of linkages between the Molly Maguires, draft violence, and labor strikes, authorities no longer
took the Pennsylvania Mollies lightly. Wolf Creek also set a precedent for the use of coffin
notices during times of strike. For example, during the strike of February 1863, coffin notices
were found at collieries threatening those who went back to work before certain superintendents
were fired. Bulik argued that the coffin notices stood as evidence that the name Molly Maguire
was embraced, adopted, and defended by the union and not just invented by Bannan.
It was clear that a group of militant elements made themselves known via public coffin
notices and targeted acts of violence and vandalism, but what they called themselves prior to the
spread of Molly Maguireism is difficult to confirm, assuming they referred to themselves by
anything at all. On several occasions, in his reports, Pinkerton spy James McParlan who was
hired by Gowen to infiltrate the Molly Maguires, cites conversations with alleged Mollies like
Frank McAndrew and others who referred to themselves and their comrades as “sleepers.” On
March 19, 1874, McParlan had a conversation with McAndrews about recruitment, in which
McAndrews said that if things were “carried out right, the sleepers would be two hundred
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strong.”93 Whether this was an embellishment on McParlan’s part was not clear, but historians
have long established the fact that McParlan meticulously and faithfully wrote his reports every
day during his investigation. Albeit biased, perhaps McParlan’s reports provided some insight
into what these men actually called themselves.

From Civil War to Labor War
After the war, discontent and ethnic tensions increased. Mine operators sought to replace
Irish workers with English and Welsh. Operators also planned to reduce wages steeply by
twenty-five to thirty percent. This spurred a broad strike in late April 1865 across most collieries
in Schuylkill County and Ashland.94 Bannan cared less about the ethnic discrimination and more
about the lack of military presence once the war ended. From the pages of his Miners’ Journal he
wrote, “The Thugs…are commencing to inaugurate again in Schuylkill County a reign of terror,”
and demanded a military presence be reinstated.95 While Bannan spread fear and Molly
Maguireism, the coal establishment made moves towards renewed military control. Otto Wilson
Davis, the president of the New York and Schuylkill Railroad, wrote to Charles E. Smith,
president of the Reading Railroad, to gain his support for the plan. Davis travelled to Washington
to lobby for troops and returned successful, albeit by questionable means. When he gave the
news to one of his top aides in the West Branch, he stated, “Am happy to inform you that the
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War Department has determined to send troops to Schuylkill County. How they were got and
why must be kept still.”96
The operators meant for the military presence to put a halt to the strike, but it only
exacerbated the issue by instigating more violence. The violence was by no means limited to the
strike and strikers, but “seemed to leach out of the mines into the mainstream of society, like the
sulfur laden water from the collieries that tinted the rocks orange in the Schuylkill.”97 General
violence and murder ensued, proving that a general lawlessness existed in the Pennsylvania
anthracite region aside from Molly Maguire activity. Most miners felt the marshal presence was
simply a cover-up for the true intentions of the operators, which was to drive up the price of coal
by cutting its supply. Clashes ensued such as the fight that broke out between Peter Monaghan,
an Irish Union Army veteran, and Tom Barrett, a miner from Big Mine Run who was trying to
keep away from authorities due to an assault charge. Barrett shot, but failed to kill Monaghan.
Barrett was sentenced to brief jail time, but was later shot and killed while trying to escape.98
One of many violent incidence, the Barrett-Monaghan brawl illustrates the generally, pervasive
violence in the anthracite region that paralleled strike violence.
Another case included Patrick Close who was gunned down alongside his brother
Michael in the Spring of 1865 after a drunken argument with a few other men over a chairbalancing trick in a Shenandoah tavern. Officials identified the shooters as James Brennan and
John Delaney. Years later, when the Pinkerton spies had infiltrated the anthracite region, a
witness claimed that the killers belonged to the Molly Maguires.99 Whether Brennan and
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Delaney were indeed Mollies is beside the point. What the Close case and accusation do show is
that first, Schuyikill County developed into an inherently violent region where the gunslinging
and lawlessness rivaled even that of the Wild West. This derived from a dangerous combination
of ethnic, political, class, and labor tensions in addition to the isolated and rough nature of the
coal industry, thus creating the perfect storm for groups like the Molly Maguires to emerge as a
loud voice of dissent. Second, this violent atmosphere paved the way for Bannan to use his
Molly Maguireism conspiracy theory to blame Mollies for the violent strikes and the
accompanying disorder. The Civil War allowed Bannan to bend and shape Molly Maguireism
into more than just an affront to his idealized vision of a labor utopia and Republican way of life;
in his hands, Molly Maguireism became a fear-inducing mechanism and scapegoat for the
constant post war strikes and, in turn, justification for a renewed military presence. Furthermore,
the later speculation that Brennan and Delaney were Mollies anticipates railroad tycoon Franklin
Gowen’s later attempts to point to Molly Maguireism as the reason why unionism and collective
action in Schuylkill County stood in the way of progress.
By as early as June 10, 1865, miners showed a willingness to go back to work as long as
wages were only cut by ten to fifteen percent as opposed to the original twenty-five to thirty.
Unfortunately, the Miners’ Journal reported, the mine operators and the 202nd Pennsylvania
volunteers did not budge.100 Since the war was over and the labor shortage ceased, operators
were less inclined to simply concede and settle labor disputes. The coal companies, more
centralized and militarized in this postwar era, now had the muscle to evict union militants and
crush strikes.101 As the strike evaporated and the army left the coal fields, the killings and
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violence increased. For example, David Muir, a mine official, was shot through the heart and
stabbed three times on his way to work. Two weeks later, two other mine officials became
victims of a new trend: highway robbery. William Pollock, a mine superintendent, and his son
were held up while taking the payroll to Crow Hollow colliery; and as he drove his carriage from
Mount Pleasant to Minersville, three Irishmen allegedly held up Percival Byerly. At Phoenix
Park colliery, where the Miners’ Journal first recorded the name Molly Maguire in an industrial
dispute, the home of retired mine boss, Philip Whalen, was raided.102
The absence of the military allowed the Molly Maguires to exact vengeance and settle
their scores across the West Branch. Where the strike of 1865 and the Union Benevolent
Association had failed the miners, the Mollies took action. The increased violence and Benjamin
Bannan’s cries to “address the reign of terrorism” by petitioning the Pennsylvania state
legislature to create a homegrown military unit, led to the creation of the Coal and Iron Police.103
The Coal and Iron Police functioned as a paramilitary force meant to replace the troops that were
there during and immediately after the war. A few historians like Henry George drew a direct
comparison between the Coal and Iron Police and feudalism in the Irish countryside:
The coal and iron police are suggestive of Ireland to anyone who has seen that
unfortunate country while landlordism was yet in strength. Their functions on the
coal estates are a combination of those performed for the Irish Landlords by the
‘rent warner,’ the ‘process server,’ the ‘emergency man,’ and the Royal Irish
Constabulary. They are the spies, informers, collectors, writ servers, and guards of
their employers, licensed always to carry arms and make arrests.104
The Coal and Iron Police helped transform the Pennsylvania coal region into the Ireland
many workers left behind. It had become a new Ireland workers left behind. In some ways, it had
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become a new Ireland where the Irish and their fellow miners were again under the thumb of an
oppressive landlord class.

“King Coal” and the WBA
In 1866, the Philadelphia and Reading Railroad chose Franklin B. Gowen as its Pottsville
counsel. The railroad became so impressed with his ability that it invited him to Philadelphia to
head up its legal department, and it’s from there that Gowen began cultivating his monopoly. He
observed that the railroad’s dependence on anthracite traffic stood as its greatest strength as well
as its greatest weakness. The majority of Reading’s income derived from anthracite. Also, the
Reading did not have a friendly relationship with other railroads that could link the Reading to
the West. So, until the Reading could create a more profitable western connection, Gowen knew
it would have to rely on its anthracite traffic. It was at this point, that he began to press his
company into taking a greater interest in management of the coal trade. Anthracite coal remained
a large source of fuel for heating homes and running factories in the eastern United States.
However, at times, production increased more rapidly than demand which sent prices falling
drastically.105
In the midst of the post war crime wave and constant striking, another man saw a
different avenue to restoring prosperity to the coal regions. John Siney, a thirty-nine year old
Irishman, came to the United States in 1862 and began working in the mines. After a strike in
1867, Siney realized that in order to be successful, the miners needed an organization with a
treasury. That summer, he united a few local unions from his home mining town of St. Clair into
a Workingman’s Benevolent Association in order to provide sick and death benefits for its
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members. In the two decades following the Civil War trade union activity across the United
States endeavored to organize workers in their own crafts in order to defend wages and work
rules. In dialogue with intellectuals and reformers, they strove to act as the voice of the working
class as a whole. In the coal regions of PA, the WBA attempted to open up channels of
communication between Gowen and the workingmen toiling in the mines, but the union
ultimately failed in this task. David Montgomery argued that most nineteenth century trade
unions were unable to succeed in the latter task due to employers’ resistance which was made too
effective by technological changes, economic crises, and the arrival of new workers, meaning
immigrants.106 Additionally, in the particular case of the WBA, ethnic tensions between Irish and
Welsh members as well as regionalism and the inability to bridge the gap between contract
miners and laborers contributed to its later collapse.
Siney saw an opportunity to expand his fledgling union after the Pennsylvania state
legislature passed a new law decreeing that after July 1, 1868, a work day should consist of eight
instead of ten hours. With the passage of the eight-hour work day law in July of 1868, miners
assumed that they would work for less hours with the same amount of pay. Predictably, the
operators did not see eye to eye with their employees. When operators refused to grant them an
eight-hour work day without a reduction in wages, the men took action. The miners of collieries
near Ashland decided not to go to work on Monday morning and instead paraded from mine to
mine, calling out their fellow workers along the way. Due to the inherent nature of the anthracite
industry, a halt in production such as a strike proved beneficial to the market. After a month of
work suspension, the price of coal increased and allowed operators to acquiesce to a ten percent
wage increase for their employees. With that, the Eight-Hour Strike ended. John Siney’s union
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was one of several labor organizations that rose to power in in the United States the late 1860s as
part of the eight-hour day movement. Recognizing the connection between exploitation and
unfair wages for long hours, labor organizations like the Machinist’s and Blacksmith’s
International Union and numerous Eight-hour Leagues struck in support of the eight-hour work
day.107 The perceived success of the strike made miners realize collective action could give them
the rights they deserved and they became more enthusiastic about John Siney’s new union.
Eventually the WBA encompassed about thirty local unions and 30,000 members or four fifths
of laborers in the Pennsylvania anthracite industry. Now more organized, the WBA’s General
Council took action and encouraged all mining to stop on May 10, 1869.108
However, Siney was unable to achieve the industry wide unity needed for the strike to be
a complete success. Nevertheless, the WBA made some headway in moving the operators
towards collective bargaining. Siney convinced the owners of the Lehigh and Schuylkill regions
to include a sliding wage scale in their wage agreements. A sliding scale was based on the price
of coal. Wages would increase with coal prices and stay at an agreed upon minimum if prices
fell. The agreements defined this as the “basis.” Rates of pay at Lehigh were determined by what
a ton sold for in Elizabethport, New Jersey. If coal priced at five dollars a ton, the miners’ share
was 57 1/2 cents. If the price rose, miners’ wages increased fifteen percent and if they fell, they
received the 57 1/2 basis. For Schuylkill, the wage agreement set the basis at three dollars a ton,
based on prices out of Port Carbon. Wages would increase five percent with each jump of
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twenty-five cents in coal prices.109 This basis question would remain a point of contention for the
next five years.
From his position in Philadelphia, Gowen kept a cautious eye on the rise of the WBA in
the coal regions. The prolonged suspensions of work in the coal fields disrupted the railroad
business and Gowen disagreed with the idea of the union controlling production and wages. He
felt that if the price of coal fell to $2.50 per ton, more could be sold and the Reading’s
production would increase. In January of 1870, the railroad board elected Franklin Gowen to
replace an ailing Charles Smith as president. Gowen finally held the position he needed to justify
intervening in the basis dispute.
As the WBA expanded its influence, the organization succeeded in blurring the lines of
craft and national origin that had divided workers in the anthracite region for so long. As Kenny
observed, the general absence of Molly activity after 1868 strongly demonstrated the success of
this effort. So too did it explain a Molly resurgence after the dissolution of the WBA in 1875.
The WBA and the Molly Maguires employed different strategies to achieve the same ends,
making them separate organizations, but the fact that one influenced the other in such a manner
demonstrates that to completely separate them diminishes the importance of each in the labor
wars within the anthracite region. Miners rose above their differences through their belief in
common goals most notably higher wages, welfare for sick and crippled miners, and safer
working conditions.110
Mine workers faced a series of occupational hazards. Diseases like “miners’ asthma” or
“black lung disease” and a variety of other fatal pulmonary disorders caused by the constant
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inhalation of coal dust, powder, smoke, and underground gases plagued miners and their
families. Thousands died from it, including John Siney in 1880.111 Miners faced the even greater
risk of injury or even death in their daily lives. A large fall of coal or rock could kill a man
directly or indirectly by either blocking air passages or by hitting a pillar causing the mine roof
to collapse. Workers also faced the threat of asphyxiation or explosions caused by the variety of
gases that were constantly pumped into the mines from underground. Occupational accidents
could kill one or two miners, others killed dozens. If a strata under a river collapsed, or if miners
tapped into an unsuspected body of water, miners also faced possible death by drowning. The
most lethal accidents involved fire and gas.112
Molly Maguireism even found its way into the politics of mine safety. Originally,
operators placed the blame for any accident that occurred in the mines on the neglect of
individual mine workers. By 1870, Molly Maguireism became so engrained in the coal mining
community, that the operators blamed them exclusively. As Anthony Wallace emphasized, “all
fires, floods, and accidents were liable to be classed as acts of terrorism committed by a hard
core of radical miners, the Molly Maguires.” Every explosion or roof collapse was interpreted as
industrial sabotage and attributed to the same heinous organization.113 The battle for mine safety
came to a head with the passage of the Mine Safety Act of 1870. The act stood as an illustration
of the power of collective action, and yet it was not a definitive victory for the labor movement,
but a victory nonetheless. The act took a great amount of autonomy away from the miners and
placed more power in the hands of the operators. Workers benefitted from having the
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responsibility of safety transferred onto the shoulders of their bosses, but the mines became more
disciplined institutions where the miners no longer had as much control in the workplace.114
In the first years of its existence, the WBA claimed a series of victories. However, Siney
soon found himself faced with a fundamental obstacle: Franklin B. Gowen’s Reading Railroad.
In order for Gowen to gain control of the lower coal region, the independent operators and the
independent middlemen who controlled the marketing of coal in Philadelphia had to be driven
out of business. Fighting on the side of organized labor, the WBA sought to control coal
production and distribution. Their strategy involved limiting the amount of coal mined and sent
to market which, in theory, would keep coal prices and wages high. Gowen, a railroad tycoon
and master manipulator, instead claimed that corporate control of the industry would guarantee
stable wages and prices. Furthermore, unlike Siney and the WBA, he believed the best way for
the railroad to turn a profit was for the coal fields to send as much coal to the market as
possible.115

Gowen’s Battle: The Basis and the Years Leading Up to the Long Strike, 1870-1873
Schuylkill miners struck yet again in January of 1870. That December, the price of coal
fell below three dollars a ton causing the operators to realize that the benefits of sliding wage
scale did not go both ways. The operators suggested to the WBA that the sliding scale needed go
down as well as up and therefore, the basis should be set at two dollars. The union refused,
which led the operators to raise the basis to $2.50, but under one condition: the regulation would
not go into effect until that coming April. Dissatisfied, the miners struck. After four months of
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expensive idleness, Welsh operator Benjamin B. Thomas conferenced with John Siney in the
attempt to reach settlement. Thomas also reached out to Gowen to aid as mediator and Gowen
agreed. After receiving instructions from the Anthracite Board of Trade, operators’ organization,
Gowen sat down with the executive committee of the WBA on July 22, 1870.
The union proposed an increase in wages from five percent to eight and half percent with
each twenty-five cent increase in the price of coal. In return, the union agreed to the same rate of
decrease as the price of coal fell below three dollars with a basis of two dollars. Gowen pointed
out that the price of coal would not rise above $2.50 for 1870, but he agreed to lower the price of
freight which would allow the price of coal to rise at the mines. Known as the “Gowen
Compromise,” it was incorporated by the Board of Trade and stood as the first written contract
between miners and operators in America.116 Initially, the “Gowen Compromise” was important
for two reasons. First, it illustrated Gowen’s master manipulation skills; his participation caused
the workingmen to believe that the president of the Reading was on their side when in reality, he
wanted nothing more than to bring down the union. Second, the compromise would eventually
help Gowen and his railroad begin buying out independent operators as it set a precedent of a
corporation dictating policy in the lower anthracite region.
However, the miners grew disillusioned with Gowen after the first pay day when they
found their wages docked eight and a quarter percent. The formally enthusiastic miners now
denounced the president of the Reading for their plight. One miner went to the Pottsville Miners’
Journal with his testament:
We are positively assured that if coal fell in the market, when the compromise
was made, that tolls [freight rates] were to correspond with the prices of coal and
wages; but coal and wages are falling, while the prices of tolls are going up as
116
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rapidly as coal falls, all of which comes off the miners and laborers who produce
the coal. This is not what we bargained for.117
The miners, unprepared for another strike, were forced to accept the wages that emerged from
the 1870 settlement for 1871.
One of Gowen’s first hurdles in his pursuit of a monopoly was the Pennsylvania state
legislature. His law background allowed him to flirt his way around the railroad’s state charter
that barred the Reading from owning mining operations. In January of 1871, Gowen sought to
create a front company for which he and crony lawmaker drew up a charter; in the fine print, the
charter granted the Reading the right to own coal lands. Unfortunately for Gowen, he had made
enemies in the state Senate rather quickly. Opponent Esias Billingfelt investigated the front
company and when he found out it was the Reading in disguise, the senator quickly shut down
the provision. Undeterred, Gowen decided to buy coal lands under his own name. He attempted
the front company ploy again, this time under the Laurel Improvement Coal Company.
This time, the Senate denied the provision by only three votes. However, after the Senate
denied the provision for the Laurel Run Improvement Company, they adjourned, and when they
reconvened, two of the nay sayers mysteriously disappeared and the third changed his vote.
Bowen and the Reading had won. Senate Act No. 817 gave the Reading the power to purchase,
sell, transport, and mine coal and iron “and for this purpose the said company shall have power
to acquire from time to time by purchase, lease, or otherwise such lands as they may deem
expedient.” The act also allowed the president of the railroad and six directors under him to
exercise corporate agency to purchase stock and lands from any other incorporated company in
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the state of Pennsylvania.118 Essentially, the Reading now had the legal means to crush the
independent operators. The legislation also created a space for Gowen to infiltrate and
manipulate the industry in ways that later allowed Pinkerton Detectives to take down the WBA,
trade unionism, and the Molly Maguires from the inside.
A general suspension took place in January 1871 and the WBA demanded the minimum
be set back to the 1869 basis of $3.00 per ton. Gowen fought back by raising the freight rates so
high that they were double the price of coal which resulted in the prevention of any wage
negotiations between the WBA and the Board of Trade. On February 23, the operators’ wage
committee attempted to issue another compromise with the workers by agreeing to the terms set
the previous November, but the operators themselves rejected this. The WBA also refused to
acquiesce.119 The Miners’ Journal of February 27, 1871, ran a story condemning the “tyranny
and oppression” of the union leaders and called for martial law. “If any of these leaders should
interfere in any way, arrest, try and punish them on the spot,” Bannan demanded.120 The WBA
continued to hold out for the 1869 basis. Bannan accused the WBA of conspiracy and anarchy
which demonstrated an important step in the evolution of Molly Maguireism in that its detractors
such as Bannan gradually identified the movement with trade unionism.
Under the headline, “Tyranny in Schuylkill County,” Bannan announced that “few people
have an adequate conception of the tyranny which exists in Schuylkill County at the hands of the
prominent leasers of the WBA…Men dare not work, and their families must starve. In the
meetings of the Association, any man who would even attempt to complain or express an
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independent opinion, would be hooted down and cowed into silence.” Bannan demanded an
answer to the question, how much longer could society stand “this system of terrorism and
tyranny?”121 Even though Bannan did not mention the name Molly Maguire, his mention of
“terrorists” suggested that he believed there was a clear connection between the secret society
and the WBA as, in his mind, they were run by the same “terrorists.” Gowen’s boost to the
freight rates also brought the strike into the public eye. In the late nineteenth century increasing
numbers of Americans were already troubled by the unrestricted growth of corporations and the
idea of monopoly. By raising freight rates, Gowen demonstrated to the people the power that
corporations could wield. The citizens of anthracite coal region petitioned the state legislature to
put the coal-carriers in check. As a result of the exorbitant freight rates, the Senate Committee on
the Judiciary was authorized to launch an investigation into the transportation companies to
determine whether making freight rates so prohibitive put them in violation of their charters.122
Gowen appeared before the Judiciary Committee of the Senate in March 1871. He
immediately seized the spotlight by steering attention away from the transportation companies
and focusing on the entire background of the strike. Gowen spoke about the WBA and how it
was his goal to secure employment for all members and prevent the reduction in wages. Yet, he
effectively blamed the union for the current state of the industry. He claimed that the WBA
wanted increased wages with less work so that the miners could make more in seven or eight
months than they did previously in the whole year. Moreover, he accused the WBA of forcing
working men who were happy with their situation into idleness. Gowen pointed out that workers
could not be paid the 1869 basis unless the price of coal increased. So the WBA suspended work
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until the prices reached an amount that provided them with an acceptable wage Gowen also
expressed his opinion that the WBA’s demands were unreasonable as they wanted both
unchanging wages and to be given a percentage of the mine owner’s profits. Gowen failed to
mention that because miners could not work all year round, they needed a slightly higher wage to
make up for the winter months in which they made little to no money and that wages were
divided among miners and the laborers who worked directly under them. Also, the coal
companies forced miners to submit to outlandish store prices and rent. So the wages they did
make barely allowed them to break even. Clearly illustrating Montgomery’s thesis that “trade
union activists endeavored…to act as the voice of the working class as a whole in a dialogue
with bourgeois intellectuals and reformers concerning the future of America’s republican
institutions,” Gowen declared, “Those who labor with their hands should yield to those who
labor with their minds.”123
Gowen further defended his actions by stating he acted solely to protect the colliery
owners by doing away with the middle men and factors that controlled the outlet of predicted
coal to be shipped. He claimed this would increase the operators’ revenue because intermediate
profits would be saved. He also dismissed the rumors and accusations by retailers that the
Reading had created some kind of railroad syndicate to restrain trade by stating that he merely
told his fellow railroad presidents what he was doing and they followed suit. Overall, he indicted
the WBA for forcing men to stop working, forcing the poor to pay high prices for coal, and for
ruining the iron industry. “The laboring classes have been reduced to starvation; the coal
operators have been reduced to the verge of insolvency; the iron trade has been completely
paralyzed; and, looking over the ruin and havoc they have made, the leader of this association
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[the WBA] see one other interest which they have not yet subdued.”124 Then Gowen dramatically
predicted that if the WBA continued on their course, it would mean the end of the coal trade in
the state. “There can be no doubt that Pennsylvania will have to bid farewell to its great iron
manufacturers, and be content to see other states that are free from the tyrannical rule of trade
unions prosper in an industry, which, by proper care, she should have retained forever for
herself,” he testified. Gowen so skillfully diverted the investigation away from the railroad, that
the WBA became preoccupied with defending itself, instead of attacking the president. Gowen
convinced the committee and in their final report they agreed that the legislature had no power to
act and any further suit against the railroads would be considered interference.125
Dovetailing with Gowen’s testimony in front of the Pennsylvania state legislature,
Bannan responded to a publication in the New York Herald that asserted “the Molly Maguires do
not belong to the WBA,” by retorting, “this is not true; they all belong, because they could not
get any work whatever if they did not. There are but two classes in this Region - members of the
WBA, or what they term ‘blacklegs.’” Since all miners belonged to the WBA, Bannan argued, so
too did the Molly Maguires.126 This was not completely true, as at least one fourth of the miners
in the anthracite region did not belong to the union. By the same token, members of the secret
society may have belonged to the WBA, but Bannan, like Gowen assumed the leadership of the
union, who were strenuously opposed to violence, reflected the values of the rank and file, who
presumably included some elements that supported more drastic and radical action.
With the railroad in one corner and the WBA in the other, the independent operators’ fate
was sealed. Feeling the pressure, most sold out to the Reading, which had acquired 65,000 acres
124

Gowen, Argument of Franklin B. Gowen Before the Judiciary Committee of the Senate of
Pennsylvania, 29.
125
Schlegel, Ruler of the Reading, 29.
126
MJ, March 11, 1871.

71
of coal lands by 1872. Some, like Benjamin B. Thomas, refused to go down without a fight. In
their exchange of letters, Thomas explained that the retailers did not want to come under the
company and they would not give up their rights to honorable competition and the laws of supply
and demand. Gowen then informed Thomas that the Reading Railroad was simply acting in its
best interests and that the railroad already had “a very large number of collieries of its own” and
believed “that it could materially aid the owners of other good coal in disposing of their product
at good prices.” He concluded that he “thought it proper to present to the owners of these
collieries the opportunity of uniting their product with that of the company.” Thomas viewed this
as an intrusion and proceeded to accused Gowen of “bribery, fraud, and corruption.”127 Thomas
spoke not only for himself and his fellow independent operators, but also for many in the wider
public who feared the concentration of power in corporate hands. The railroads eliminated the
small operators and subjugated “the laboring man” in addition to encroaching upon individual
enterprise and personal rights.”128 Unfortunately, the objections of Thomas and the opposing
operators he stood for, were in vain. Despite such protests, Gowen succeeded in controlling the
coal retail trade in Philadelphia under the Reading Railroad.
The Reading Railroad’s, later renamed the Philadelphia and Reading Coal and Iron
Company, embarked on a buying spree that left the company and its Laurel Run subsidiary $75
million in debt.129 The company required a continuous supply of coal to pay off this exorbitant
debt and to guarantee that supply, the company needed to subjugate its workers. That meant
destroying the two organizations that symbolized workers’ autonomy: the WBA and the Molly
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Maguires. In his book, St. Clair, Anthony Wallace aptly described Franklin B. Gowen as “one
of the great architects of industrial capitalism in America.”130 The Philadelphia and Reading
Railroad’s rise under Gowen provided an opportunity for a resurgence of the Molly Maguires in
the 1870s. Gowen viewed the Molly Maguires, unionism, and the small operators as fundamental
obstacles to his lofty goal of a monopoly over coal production and transportation in eastern
Pennsylvania. Gowen transformed the Philadelphia and Reading from the shipper of coal to its
main producer in the Schuylkill field.
***
By the eve of the Panic of 1873, Gowen successfully did away with the small scale
operators and their retailers, paving the way for the Reading to take control of production and
distribution of coal in the Schuylkill coal fields. His manipulation of freight rates and purchasing
of coal lands drove out the independent operators and he effectively eliminated the retailers in
Philadelphia by marketing, producing, and transporting his own coal. Gowen slowly replaced the
WBA as chief arbiter of labor relations in the coal fields and in so doing, deeply undermined the
union by insisting that the railroad and not the workers should control coal production.
Furthermore, by repeatedly connecting the WBA to Molly Maguireism, Gowen and Bannan
raised the specter of Molly Maguireism ideal to a new level. The Molly Maguires went from
simply operating beside trade unionism to clashing with it head on.
Between 1857 and 1873, Molly Maguireism became a part of several facets of anthracite
and Schuylkill County history. Using his Miners’ Journal as a mouthpiece, Benjamin Bannan
first linked Molly Maguireism to the large numbers of Irish laborers in the coal fields. A staunch
Republican and advocate of an entrepreneurial labor class, Bannan viewed the Irish as a threat to
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his Republican values and his ideal labor utopia in which a laborer strove to improve his
conditions in the hopes that he too could own property and become a small operator. The Molly
Maguireism created by Bannan was one connected to undesirable Irish Catholicism, to
Democratic conspiracies, to violence, and finally, to trade unionism more generally. This was not
to say that Benjamin Bannan also created or made up the Molly Maguires themselves to
stigmatize trade unionism. By 1862, an unidentified group embraced the name Molly Maguire as
proven by coffin notices that began to pop up in the collieries during times of strike or after an
act of vandalization, assault, or murder. The idea that a group as large as the AOH or the WBA
did not have some radical elements was certainly possible. What they called themselves before
embracing Molly Maguires is still just speculation. And yet, Bannan, with Gowen, created and
spread a powerful idea, an image that would transcend the actual members themselves and the
anthracite region. Because of these two men, the concept of Molly Maguireism became
synonymous with Civil War draft violence, general violence and vandalization in the anthracite
region, and trade unionism.
The American Civil War was a pivotal five years for Molly Maguireism and the coal
industry as a whole. Note only was it during the war when an anonymous group first identified
themselves Mollies, but Molly Maguireism also became a scapegoat for the consistent draft
violence and general violence in the coal fields. Finally, by the end of the war, Molly
Maguireism started to become interchangeable with trade unionism as miners established the
short-lived Union Benevolent Association. The coal industry boomed during the war, but ethnic
and political tensions ran high as operators began to take federal action against striking workers.
The constant striking during the Civil War also illustrated the fact that miners and laborers began
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to form a sort of class consciousness that bled into the postwar years and that informed the
formation of the WBA.
The WBA grew from meagre beginnings, from simply providing miners with death and
sick benefits to Siney’s dream of an industry-wide trade union that rocked the coal industry. For
the first time in the anthracite region’s history, miners united into a single, well-organized union
despite different craft and ethnic backgrounds. On a greater level, the WBA represented a
movement away from the direct violent action of the unions of the 1840s and 1850s and towards
organized strikes and negotiations. The WBA of St. Clair stood as the last in a series of attempts
by local labor unions in the anthracite region in the 1860s. Unlike its preceding unions, which
tended to last only a few months and claim membership in only one town or county, the WBA
lasted for seven years and its membership spanned multiple counties.
Kevin Kenny argued that the formation of the WBA demonstrated a shift towards fullfledged trade unionism, and something distinctly different and separate from Molly Maguireism.
Molly Maguireism and fully developed trade unionism, he explained, represented different
modes of organization and protest.131 However, Kenny’s attempt to completely separate Molly
Maguireism is complicated by two factors. First, Kenny separated the union from Molly
Maguireism in order to depict the creation of the WBA as a step towards progressivism and a
modern definition of unionism in the anthracite region of Pennsylvania. But, it was the very start
and stop nature of unionism in the anthracite region that created Molly Maguireism. Second, as
the preceding chapters demonstrate, the eventual dissolution of the WBA led to and represented
the last step in the evolution of Molly Maguireism. Gowen used Molly Maguireism to convince
retailers and mine owners that unionism stood in the way of capitalism and presented himself as
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the industry’s savior against the evils of unionism and Molly Maguireism. The Mollies and the
WBA are not unrelated, for the Molly Maguires and groups like them emerged out of the failure
of unionism to give the miners the rights they deserved.
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CHAPTER 4
LABOR SPIES AND THE LONG STRIKE
Allan Pinkerton was born in Glasgow, Scotland on August 25, 1819. Pinkerton came to
the United States in 1842 and settled in a Scottish enclave about forty miles outside of Chicago,
Illinois. In 1855, he opened a private detective agency where he specialized in spying on railroad
conductors and other employees. In 1861, Pinkerton moved to Philadelphia along with five of his
operatives to supervise railroad protection services for the Wilmington & Baltimore Railroad.
While on this assignment, Pinkerton discovered a plot to assassinate President Abraham Lincoln
in Baltimore as he was on his way to his inaugural in Washington. With this on his resume,
General George B. McClellan hired Pinkerton and his agents to do detective work for the Union
army, a position in which he served from May 1861 to November 1862 when both he and
McClellan lost their jobs.132
Pinkerton used the money he earned during the war to expand his agency nationally,
opening offices in New York and Philadelphia. The Reading Railroad employed Pinkerton in
1863 and again in 1870 to spy on its conductors. So it was no surprise that Gowen turned to
Pinkerton in 1873 to take care of a more pressing matter. As of 1873, the newly established
Philadelphia and Reading Coal and Iron Company had defeated the majority of the independent
operators. However, Gowen still had two other obstacles with which to contend: the WBA and
the Molly Maguires. Rumors of a rejuvenation of Molly activity placed the WBA on Gowen’s
back burner. In the early months of 1873, Schuylkill County mine superintendents were
threatened and beaten, several railroad cars were derailed, and there were several incidents of
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arson.133 Pinkerton, whose attention was now turned to social disorder and general crime within
the railroad and mining industry, suddenly and unknowingly became a third major player in the
spread and evolution of Molly Maguireism.

Enter Detective James McParlan
Gowen called a meeting with Pinkerton in October of 1873 to talk about the Molly
Maguires and the threat they represented to the mining industry and, in turn, his monopoly. In
their meeting, Pinkerton reports that Gowen referred to Molly Maguireism as an infestation and a
“noxious weed” of “foreign birth” that had a grip upon all parts of the country in which
anthracite is consumed. Pinkerton’s report must be taken with a grain of salt as he wrote it almost
immediately after the showcase Molly executions over three years later when twenty Mollies,
including John Kehoe, would be hanged by the state. He clearly wanted to appeal to people who
still suffered under the fear of Molly Maguireism and still remembered the trials and executions
vividly. Throughout his recollection, Pinkerton presents Gowen as a man of the people whose
only motive was justice and the protection of the people in the anthracite region. In turn, he
represents himself as simply Gowen’s willful servant.
Pinkerton published a pamphlet in 1873 in which he stated, “The profession of the
Detective is a high and honorable calling. Few professions excel it. He is an officer of justice,
and must himself be pure and above reproach.” Pinkerton further divulges that a detective
sometimes had to employ deceptive and covert means in order to do his job: “It cannot be too
strongly impressed upon Detectives that secrecy is the prime condition of success in all their
operations.” According to Pinkerton, a detective had to become an actor of sorts and, as an actor,
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he sometimes had to play the part of a criminal. “It frequently becomes necessary for the
Detective, when brought into contact with Criminals, to pretend to be a Criminal.”134
In their meeting, Gowen expressed a desire to hire an undercover detective from the
Pinkerton agency and Allan Pinkerton set to work to find the perfect agent for infiltrating the
Molly Maguires, one of Ulster Catholic origins who would blend in and who possessed an
intimate knowledge of the region’s violent peasant secret societies.135 Pinkerton chose James
McParlan in October of 1873 to investigate the Molly Maguires with the intention to take them
down from the inside. He was described as “medium height, a slim build but a wire figure, well
knit together; clear hazel eye; hair of an auburn color…with a beard and mustache…there was no
mistaking McParlan’s place of nativity, even had not his slight accent betrayed his Celtic
origin.”136
Shortly after his meeting with Gowen, on October 8, 1873, Pinkerton ordered McParlan
to draw up a report on secret societies in Ireland. On the 27th, McParlan left Philadelphia for
Pottsville where he spent the next two and a half years gathering evidence against the Molly
Maguires under the alias James McKenna. Once in Pottsville, McParlan spent most of his time at
Pat Dormer’s saloon where he started hearing stories about the Molly Maguires concentrated in
Giradville, Shenandoah, and Mahanoy City. He decided to make his way to Shenandoah where
he “played the part of Irish laborer.”137

134

Pinkerton’s National Detective Agency, General Principles of Pinkerton’s National Detective Agency
(Chicago: Fergus Printing Company, 1873), 6-10 as quoted in Kenny, Making Sense of the Molly
Maguires, 153-154.
135
Allan Pinkerton, The Molly Maguires: and the Detectives (1877; repr., G. W. Dillingham Co.: New
York, 1887), 13-18.
136
Samuel T. Wiley, Biography and Portrait Encyclopedia of Schuylkill Co. (Philadelphia: Henry W.
Ruoff, Rush, West and Company, 1893).
137
Historical Society of Pennsylvania, reports of James McParlan, January 26, 1874-May 4, 1874.

79
McParlan’s policing of the Molly Maguires produced one of the only extant documents
on the Mollies aside from Alan Pinkerton’s semi-fictional book, published about a century after
the showcase trials of 1876 and 1878. Because they based their analysis of Molly Maguires on
McParlan’s reports, early historians of the Mollies arrived at similar conclusions: They either
echoed McParlan’s, Gowen’s, and Bannan’s portrayal of the Molly Maguires as an evil
organization fixed on destroying the coal industry, or they characterized the Molly Maguires as a
fiction fabricated by the railroad or the operators in order to invoke fear and suppress unionism.
As McParlan’s movements have been thoroughly described and analyzed by previous historical
works, he will only make brief appearances throughout this paper.138

The Panic of 1873 and “Labor Spies”
While McParlan began his battle against the Molly Maguires, another battle raged at the
union level. The year 1873 began a nationwide deflationary crisis that lasted until 1897, and
which generated constant conflict over wages and costs of production.139 The depression spelled
disaster for labor. Historians have estimated that by 1877, one-fifth of the nation’s workingmen
were unemployed, two-fifths worked no more than six or seven months out of the year, and only
one-fifth worked regularly. Of those with regular work, wages dropped an average of fifty
percent. Urban industries suffered the most under the weight of the depression. In New York
City, about 90,000 laborers lost their homes. Demonstrations by the unemployed were a common
occurrence in Chicago and New York. When a group of unemployed paraded in New York to
demand a public works program, they were assaulted by police. In Chicago, 20,000 unemployed
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workers rallied in the streets in the early winter of 1873-1874 to demand “bread for the needy,
clothing for the naked and houses for the homeless.”140
The Pennsylvania coal fields also saw a rise in crime with the onset of the depression. A
general lawlessness characterized by prostitution, assaults, and bar brawls were common, many
of which resulted in deaths. Such crimes brought back a name that had been relatively silenced
since the rise of the WBA in 1868: the Molly Maguires. Local newspapers blamed the Mollies
for the increase in criminal activity, which illustrating how the mining community began to
consider them a scapegoat for all negative occurrences in the coal fields. The rural and relatively
isolated nature of the coal industry did not go untouched by the depression, but normal labor
activities did not come to a complete halt as in other parts of the United States. In 1873, Franklin
B. Gowen consolidated the management of his Philadelphia and Reading Coal and Iron
Company by calling a secret meeting of all the anthracite railroad tycoons. In this meeting, the
men agreed upon a fixed price of coal at $5.00 a ton and divided the market. The Reading
received the bulk at 27.85 percent of the total; the Hudson, 18.37; Jersey Central, 16.15; Lehigh,
15.98; Lackawanna, 13.80; and the Pennsylvania Coal Company 9.85.141 At this point in history,
anti-trust laws were not enforced. Ironically, while Gowen sought a collective solution to protect
railroad barons from the economic downturn, he condemned similar collective strategies utilized
by his employees.
That October, John Siney stepped down as president of the WBA to pursue a promotion
as president of a burgeoning miners’ union which embraced both anthracite miners in central and
eastern Pennsylvania as well as bituminous coal miners in western Pennsylvania and Ohio. The
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Miners’ National Association promoted arbitration versus strikes as the preferred way to govern
relationships between employers and workers. By 1875, the union achieved 35,000 members and
secured a standard wage rate in the Tuscarawas Valley in Ohio142 Siney’s partner John F. Walsh
assumed leadership of the WBA, or the Miners’ and Laborers’ Benevolent Association
(M&LBA), as it was renamed. However, Siney’s departure and the nationwide depression dealt
the M&LBA a major blow from which it never recovered.
The basis had yet to be determined as of January 1874. That December, the Miners’
Journal reported the M&LBA represented by John Siney, William Morgan, Jeremiah Caroll,
Thomas Taylor, and James Brennan met with representatives from the railroad: Franklin Gowen,
George Johns, Daniel Miller, William Kendrick, George Cole, William Breneiser, and Theodore
Garretson. The report presented the meeting as if two opposing sides were coming together to do
battle with the M&LBA, unionism, and workingmen on one side and Franklin B. Gowen, the
Anthracite Board of Trade, operators, and capitalism on the other. The two parties met in the
office of the Philadelphia and Reading Coal and Iron Company in Philadelphia, already giving
an unfair advantage to the railroad tycoons as it was in their own domain. The leaders of the
M&LBA wanted to secure the basis wage of 1873. They also wanted to adhere to the 1873 basis
prices of coal per ton with no deduction for contract work—$2.75 per ton for day work and
$2.50 per ton for contract work. Furthermore, individual operators objected to the monthly prices
of coal per ton proposed by the Philadelphia and Reading Coal and Iron Company. Since neither
party could agree on anything, they set a future meeting for January 8th of 1874. Always the
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supporter of the entrepreneurial and competitive market culture of labor, Bannan did little to
suppress his bias in favor of the operators in the article.143
Many historians have presented Gowen and his company as an evil monolith hell bent on
destroying unionism and profiting from the oppression of the operators and workingmen. No
matter his motivations, Gowen’s strategies resulted in an increase in the production of coal by
about one million tons and the rise of the railway as the largest transporter of anthracite coal. For
the week of January 7, 1874, 52,431 tons of coal had been transported by rail as opposed to a
meagre 723 tons by canal. The Miner’s Journal reported that this was 29,283 more tons than the
prior week. In 1872, 18,400,320 tons came out of Port Carbon and in 1873, the anthracite region
produced 19,243,774 tons.144 Initially the increase in production and transport appeared as if it
would benefit everyone, but later this increase created a glut in the market that decreased wages
to a rate that led to one of the longest strikes in anthracite history.
Whether Gowen sought to force a strike in order to raise prices and cut production, as the
New York Tribune charged, or to “corner” the market, as the Commercial Advertiser accused, is
not certain. Of course, Gowen outright denied both claims as preposterous. What is certain is that
Gowen desired to annihilate unionism in the coal industry.145 Again, Gowen turned to Alan
Pinkerton for this task and paid him royally for it. In response, Pinkerton infiltrated the M&LBA
with dozens of spies, most notably P. M. Cummings who became an official of the union and a
close associate of Siney’s.146 Gowen surmised that in order to succeed, he needed to bring the
union down from the inside.
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On January 8, the M&LBA and the P&R met again to discuss the basis for 1874.
Gowen's proposal was twofold. First, he submitted that the basis stay the same except if the price
of coal declined lower than $2.50 per ton out of Port Carbon. Wages would then decline by one
percent for every three cent decline in the price below $2.50 until $2.25 was reached. Therefore,
$2.25 would be the basis according to this proposal. Second, Gowen put forward that the
monthly prices at Port Carbon were to be determined as they were in 1873 which left workers
with just a hope and a prayer that prices would not dip below $2.50. Union leaders, however,
were unwilling to budge on their insistence of the continuation of the 1873 basis. They believed
Gowen made this proposition to force them into suspension of work and, unsurprisingly, the
union unanimously rejected it. Workers wondered why the operators were so weak as to allow
Gowen to dictate to them as opposed to conducting their business amongst themselves. In a letter
to the editor, an anonymous miner was of the opinion that Gowen was nothing more than an
interference in what could otherwise be harmonious bargaining between the operators and
workers. Since Gowen represented the railroad and not the coal industry, workers and operators
had no business listening to his advice and proposals, the miner wrote. Workingmen considered
Gowen an outsider.147
For the next six months, the Philadelphia and Reading collieries produced a steady flow
of anthracite into Philadelphia’s retailers while Gowen solicited the remaining independent coal
operators, convincing them to form a new association called the Schuylkill Coal Exchange with
the aim of restricting the tonnage shipped to the Philadelphia trade in order to increase the price
of coal. In late November, Gowen announced that the Reading possessed enough coal to last
until that spring and ordered its collieries to close. Then he targeted the remaining operators who
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had not become members of the Coal Exchange. He threatened them, stating that the coal
retailers could not receive their coal after December 1, 1874 and if they could not find their own
markets, he would shut them down.148
Rumors of an impending strike began to circulate and on January 11th, 1874, the
M&LBA, who had just adopted the constitution of the newly founded National Miners’ Union,
decided to suspend work until the price of coal increased. Union leaders threatened to eject all
workers from the union who returned to work for an operator who did not agree to the 1873
basis. The strike lasted most of the month until the operators agreed to uphold the basis for 1873
and restored the wage reductions. This victory was bitter sweet as the strike left the union
movement weak and fractious. The Hazleton area experienced renewed ethnic animosity as
German-American miners left the union to create their own German-speaking organization. P.
M. Cummings, Pinkerton’s agent, also reported that the St. Clair district’s treasury was nearly
bare and they failed to send a representative to the National Labor Union’s meeting in New
York. Finally, insubordination in the Northumberland County branch caused the union board to
expel six of its eight districts.149
Meanwhile, Gowen kept a cautious eye on the M&LBA through Cummings. Gowen
charged Cummings with the task of collecting incriminating information on the union, but
according to his early reports, agent Cummings proved unsuccessful. Amidst the district meeting
discussions of by-laws and committee work, he could find no evidence that the union desired to
employ violence. The Pinkertons also failed to find evidence connecting the M&LBA to the
Molly Maguires, yet Gowen still considered the union a threat to his desire to singularly control
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the production and transportation of coal. However, in order to truly complete his destruction of
organized labor, Gowen believed that he had to exterminate the Molly Maguires as well. Both
organizations stood in the way of Gowen’s campaign to impose order and stability in the lower
anthracite region. He believed that by destroying one, the other would also fall.150
On December 1, 1874, thirty-one operators suspended work and the two other major
companies, the Lehigh and Wyoming, followed the Reading’s lead. However, while the workers
remained unconcerned about the suspension, it was the subsequent wage cuts that caused them to
push back. Lehigh operators decided on a fifteen percent reduction in contract rates and a ten
percent reduction in general wages. In turn, the Schuylkill reduced their contract rates by twenty
percent and their general wages by ten.151
Schuylkill and Lehigh miners called a strike, but it was a weak uprising at best. The
mines in these two areas had ceased production already and other counties such as Dauphin and
Northumberland refused the call to strike and remained at work. Miners in Lackawanna County
decided “by secret ballot” not to strike.152 The M&LBA strike thus stood on a fragile foundation.
Recognizing that his fledgling union was crumbling, John Siney completed his abandonment of
the M&LBA through a letter in the Miners’ Journal in which he stated that MNA and the
M&LBA were not related so as not to taint the MNA by association. In addition, many
individual miners’ adamantly declared they were not members of the M&LBA and the collieries
at which they were employed, such as the Henry Clay and Hickory Ridge colliery, were working
at the 1874 basis prices. Now effectively isolated, the M&LBA decided to go to war.

150

Kenny, Making Sense of the Molly Maguires, 156; Historical Society of Pennsylvania, report of
Benjamin Franklin to Franklin B. Gowen on the Work of Detective Cummings, March 27, 1874.
151
Aurand, From the Molly Maguires to the United Mine Workers, 88-89; Schlegel, Ruler of the Reading,
63; MJ, January 4, 1875.
152
Sunbury American, April 16, 1875.

86
The Long Strike
The M&LBA and the Reading Railroad waged its final battle in the anthracite fields
during the “Long Strike” beginning in January 1875. In the aftermath of the depression, most
trade unions had all but ceased their activities under the weight of misery and unemployment.
Despite this, the M&LBA continued its mission to become a bargaining agent for the miners of
the anthracite region and in turn, a beacon of hope for trade unionism.
Workingmen’s hope that the strike would become industry-wide gained ground as the
strike spread throughout the region. By February, miners in Wilkes Barre struck and later men
from Columbia County and Centralia joined them. Backed by the Philadelphia coal merchants,
the M&LBA petitioned the Pennsylvania legislature to conduct an investigation into the
Reading’s monopolistic practices and acquisition of large amounts of coal lands in hopes of
strengthening their offensive against the corporation. The legislature buckled under the pressure
and appointed a committee to probe the railroad. During this skirmish, Gowen pointed out that
other anthracite carrying companies had the right to own coal land and so the Reading had to
own coal land as well for self-protection. Gowen also played to the committee’s loyalty to the
state of Pennsylvania by noting that the Reading did not expand beyond the state boundaries. The
legislature would not dare vote against the only native anthracite railroad in favor of others
which served New York and New Jersey. Therefore, the committee crumbled under the pressure
and concluded that it was not their place, but the courts’ to determine the legality of the Reading
owning coal land.153
By March 1875, the union’s hold on the operators began to weaken. One last glimmer of
hope emerged when Schuylkill County miners allied with a railroad union called the Mechanics
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and Workingmen’s Benevolent Association. The Reading lowered railroad workers’ wages in the
fall of 1874 and in response, railroad workers had planned to strike when the coal dispute ended.
Gowen learned of this and fired the leaders of the M&WBA be fired. Feeling their hands had
been forced, the union struck and held a joint meeting with the Schuylkill M&LBA on March 13.
Unfortunately, the alliance had no real practical effect as the M&WBA represented shop
employees who had no real pull in the railroad industry. However, the merger boosted morale
with the miners’ union; they were not alone in the fight against monopoly.154 At the height of the
strike, unions from New York and Philadelphia contributed money to the treasury of the miners’
union “to aid in strengthening the Pennsylvania collieries in their battle with the operators.”155
Gowen responded by increasing the power of the Coal and Iron Police whose duty was to
guard strikebreakers. As the strike intensified, the police paraded through the streets of
Schuylkill County seeking striker activity that turned violent. Demonstrating that the strike did
not have the backing of the entire industry, some miners and their families were grateful for the
paramilitary presence.156 Unable to unleash their frustration on the president of the railroad
directly, strikers resorted to sidetracking engines, setting fire to cars loaded with coal, and
burning breakers and other buildings. Against John Welsh’s wishes, the miners played right into
Gowen’s hands. Welsh desperately offered to withdraw the basis system of wages and agree to
any arrangement the operators were willing to make, but the Reading and Schuylkill Coal
Exchange refused to concede, marking the beginning of the end for the union. The M&LBA’s
treasuries depleted rapidly; the union was not capable of affording a long strike. The Coal
Exchange refused to meet with the M&LBA and the union failed to obtain Gowen’s attention.
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Even with total collapse on the horizon, the M&LBA did not go down without a fight. A group
of radical workers still refused to return to work. Most of the protest erupted between
Shenandoah and Mahaony City, Molly Maguire country. Men paraded from Shenandoah to the
West Shenandoah colliery and attempted to convince the miners there to discontinue work, but
the Coal and Iron Police led by Pinkerton agent Robert Linden brought the march to a halt.
James McParlan was one of the demonstrators. The militants changed course to Mahanoy City,
collecting followers as they went. Once they reached their destination, the crowd, which grew to
thousands strong, only stopped when the sheriff’s men fired shots fired into the mob. Defeated,
the miners returned to Shenandoah and all collieries reopened the next day, June 4.157
Robert Ramsey, Benjamin Bannan’s successor at the Miners’ Journal, viewed this
outbreak of violence as an opportunity to continue the journal’s legacy as an anti-Irish, antiunion newspaper. Ramsey attacked the mine workers and the WBA calling the strike anarchy
and praising the arrival of the military and the Coal and Iron Police by stating, “Let the leaders of
these riots be hunted down and arrested.” If “the ruffians” of northern Schuylkill County “will
learn tolerance only by being shot down, it is better to shoot them down than to let them shoot
others.” Ramsey further referred to the rioters as “villains” and “scoundrels” connected with the
“Irish element” whom he blamed for running the strike.158 Like Bannan, Ramsey lumped Siney
and Welsh into one group with Irish mine workers and the Molly Maguires. In the last months of
the strike, the union leaders lost control over some of their members who preferred direct, violent
action over organized, collective action sanctioned by the union. Molly Maguireism was the
violent, enforcing arm of trade unionism in 1875, though they employed a different strategy than
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that of the M&LBA Ramsey, however, failed to see these distinctions as he blamed the Irishmen
who founded the WBA back in 1868, even though Siney had not been a part of the organization
for some time.159
Union leaders quickly responded by vehemently denouncing any link to “such
associations.” The Pottsville Workingman, the union newspaper, backpedaled and admitted the
union leaders had lost control over the rank and file and those who “have committed acts of
violence against those who have broken through the rules which the workingmen have deemed
necessary to the protection of their interests.”160 This thoroughly defined Molly Maguireism:
direct, retributive, collective action against any who infringed upon a vision of what they viewed
to be just and moral. The leaders of the M&LBA went out of their way to dissociate themselves
with these tactics; however, that did not mean they can be completely separated from Molly
Maguireism as one simply emerged out of the other’s failings.
In a meeting on June 8, 1875, union leaders announced that they would make an appeal
to Franklin B. Gowen for a settlement. Gowen rejected any possibility of a compromise on the
premise that as president of a railroad, he was not a member of the Coal Exchange and was
therefore not authorized to meet with the union over the topic of wages. He also denied the
M&LBA the right to “interfere in any manner determining the price of coal.”161 Desperate, the
union leaders turned their efforts toward members of the Coal Exchange with the aim to
compromise on a less severe wage cut than the proposal from January. Union leaders proposed a
meeting on June 12 with Shenandoah operators to discuss terms, but were met with an empty
room. Finally, on June 14, 1875, the Executive Board of the M&LBA admitted defeat. The
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leaders declared that they only returned to work “under protest” due to “the keen pangs of
hunger” that had force the men “into a reluctant acceptance of terms which, under other
circumstances, they could never have been induced to accept.”162 Reduced to near starvation, the
miners returned to work at a twenty percent cut in wages on June 14, 1875.163 This set them back
to basis wages from 1874, which is what the operators wanted all along. The rates of coal and its
transport also decreased in the aftermath of the strike. Freight rates on lump, steamboat, and
broken coal were ten percent less than coal transported by canal.164

The End of Unionism?
By the end of June 1875, most collieries in Schuylkill County were open at full
capacity. After the Long Strike the M&LBA completely collapsed, unable to keep the
disintegrating organization intact. Miners were given the chance to sign a collective contract
reflecting new terms, maintaining at least the principle of negotiation. Most of its members
affiliated themselves with the National Miners’ Union until it gave way to the Knights of Labor
in 1876. Labor relations returned to what they were before the existence of the M&LBA in that
men returned to work under terms settled by their individual employers. Workingmen were
forced to return to a wage 26.5 percent below the 1869 level. Wages continued to fall eventually
reaching their lowest point in 1877 at fifty-four percent below the 1869 level.165 Gowen and his
railroad had effectively muscled organized unionism out of the anthracite region. Historian
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Harold Aurand argued that in a way, the M&LBA killed itself by underestimating the true
weakness of the mining industry. He pointed out that by seeking to improve the wage scale
through preservation of the basis scale, the union leaders assumed the problem with coal mining
was overproduction when in reality, the weakness was over-investment. Unsatisfactory earnings
resulted from low wages and irregular employment. Regulation of production through strikes
temporarily raised wages, but it also enforced unemployment.166
During the Long Strike, the miners did succeed in controlling the production of coal
albeit briefly. The Sunbury American re-reported the Miners’ Journal’s coal report which stated
that by April of 1875, during the strike, the total coal produced in all the Pennsylvania regions
totaled 3,019,092 since January of that year; this was 910,258 tons less than the year before at
that time. The decrease in the supply of anthracite alone was 972,375 tons.167 The Carbon
Advocate reported that the week the strike ended, the anthracite region produced 305,313 tons
and 4,719,324 tons of anthracite coal were produced statewide for the year up until the month of
June. This illustrated a 1,808,897-ton decrease from the previous year when 6,528,200 tons were
produced statewide. As the graph below demonstrates, during the week of June 5, the last week
of the strike, only 25,517 tons of anthracite was produced, which was 73,015 tons less than
during the same week the year before; similarly, in the six months leading up to the end of the
strike, anthracite coal production had been reduced from the same six months during the
previous year by 1,059,793 tons. This short-lived control proved that the miners had some
modicum of success in their battle against the coal monopoly.
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Table 1.1 Anthracite coal production in Pennsylvania before and after the Long Strike
Colliery

Anthracite produced for the
week of June 5, 1875 (in tons)

Anthracite produced for the
year up to June 1875 (in tons)

Wyoming

14,149

450,351

Hazelton

5,344

212,424

Upper Lehigh

341

Beaver Meadow

412

56,696

Mahanoy

5,362

99,333

Mauch Chunk

2,193

North Easton

248

17,743

Total

25,517

839,085

Totals from 1874

98,532

1,898,879

Decrease

73,015

1,059,793

Source: Data from the Carbon Advocate, June 5, 1875.

The M&LBA showed increasing weakness from 1873 onward with the resignation of its
founder, loss of membership, growing ethnic tensions, and more continuing economic
depression. Out of the latter half of the strike emerged an attitude of working men versus strike
leaders. Many sources noted that union leaders ordered workingmen to strike, but many regretted
doing so and wished to return to work. “The men struck, as ordered, but many of them repented
their action before very long and asked to be taken back into the company’s service, while those
who held out longest were disgusted to find on applying for work that the leaders of the strike
were among the first to beg the company’s favor,” the Sunbury American observed. “The rank
and file are anxious to go to work, but the leaders still have influence enough to prevent it.”168
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The union’s internal differences clearly contributed to its disintegration. Many workers deserted
during the strike and went back to work against union leader orders and ethnic animosity was
prevalent.169 These were common characteristics of trade labor unions during the Civil War and
Reconstruction period and, as Montgomery pointed out, such internal divisions explains in part
why they failed so often.
And yet, during and after the strike, rumors spread that the Molly Maguires were at large
again. Franklin B. Gowen and Ramsey, the new editor of the Miners’ Journal, systematically
took advantage of these rumors and increasingly identified the miners’ union with the secret
society throughout the first half of 1875. Despite the union leaders’ efforts to condemn violence,
near the end of the Long Strike they lost control of some of the rank and file who took more
violent measures to achieve union goals. One of the most influential institutions in the lives of
Irish Americans, the Catholic Church, responded by rising up as a condemnatory voice against
the Mollies, causing a critical cultural conflict among the Irish. This internal struggle amongst
the Irish developed alongside a broader struggle over the social and economic future of the
anthracite region.170 The condemnation of the Mollies by the union and the Catholic Church
helped deepen the influence of Molly Maguireism in the anthracite community.
***
Most Schuylkill County historians categorized the WBA (or the M&LBA, as it was later
called) as a failure because it was all but destroyed by the Long Strike. The Long Strike was
indeed a factor in the destabilization of the union, but other internal weaknesses existed. Siney
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never quite forged the unity he needed to assure the union’s optimum strength. He fell short of
inspiring the southern coal fields to join the northern ones. The WBA also tried and failed to
lobby for the passage of laws to improve miners’ livelihood. In 1873, the union persuaded a state
representative from Schuylkill County to introduce a bill to protect miner wages, but it died in
committee. Two years later, the union, in conjunction with the Miners’ National Association,
succeeded in aiding the passage of a law that enabled miners to hire their own weigh master only
to have the operators strip this away after the WBA lost the Long Strike.171 However, as is
characteristic of American labor history, it is not always the tangible gains that define whether a
movement succeeded. In many cases the triumphs of the labor wars were metaphysical,
transcending the modern definition of success. The WBA was one such movement.
John Siney established the WBA in 1868 and in just one year his fledgling union
organized eighty-five percent of anthracite miners in Pennsylvania. By 1869, it forced operators
and mine owners to recognize the union as a bargaining agent, grant a minimum wage, and a
sliding scale of wages. At its strongest, the union gained higher wages, it sparked comradeship
among the mine workers, and, most notably, left a legacy of an underdog union fighting for the
rights of the workingmen against all odds.172 The WBA participated in, arguably, some of the
earliest uses of formal arbitration in America.173 Even after its virtual destruction, anthracite
workers continued to collectively confront labor issues. Despite occupational challenges from
laborers, operators maintained control relatively unchallenged for more than twenty years after
the demise of the WBA.
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By this time, the Pinkertons successfully infiltrated the WBA as well as the AOH with
their newest inductee, James McParlan, or James McKenna as the members knew him. The year
1875 saw both the most successful attempt at unionism and its downfall in the anthracite region
since the Civil War. In its wake, the Molly Maguires reemerged from the shadows. The WBA
had created a space for a new generation of Irish miners to build an industrial consciousness and
to achieve their goals through collective action and allowed the mine workers to overcome their
ethnic and craft differences. Molly Maguireism did not need to exist if this outlet prevailed.
However, the Long Strike took away what the miners perceived as their last chance for the
operators and the railroad to recognize them as an organized bargaining agent. The perceived
failure of unionism and more specifically the WBA acted as the main catalyst for renewed Molly
violence and the organization’s more radical leadership was the vehicle that allowed it to happen.
Moreover, the Molly Maguires grew discontented with the internal weaknesses that troubled the
WBA and the less successful mining unions before it. Retributive justice proved much more
efficient in the lawless environment of the anthracite region.
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CHAPTER 5
THE SECOND WAVE: THE REEMERGENCE AND DEMISE OF THE MOLLY
MAGUIRES, 1874-1878
Molly Maguireism existed alongside unionism in the anthracite region from the
beginning and the concentration of violence attributed to the Molly Maguires ebbed and flowed
with union progress. When union development was at its weakest, during the Civil War era and
immediately following the Long Strike, the incidence of Molly violence increased. The
victimology changed as peasant consciousness faded away and workingman consciousness
developed, but the tradition of retributive justice remained. Molly Maguireism continued to
permeate the region and the coal industry even during and after the showcase Molly trials and
executions from 1876 to 1878 and was further exacerbated by media outlets like the Miners’
Journal and by Franklin Gowen and the Pinkertons.

The Two Wave Theory
Molly Maguire activity can be organized into two distinct, but connected concentrations
interrupted only by the success of the WBA. The rudimentary efforts to establish unions of the
1840s and 1850s paved the way for Civil War era Molly Maguireism, albeit with more violence.
Workers’ failed efforts to unionize in addition to draft resistance during the war resulted in the
first wave which centered in and around Cass and Branch Townships in southern Schuylkill
County. An area with a large Irish majority, Cass and Branch Townships became centers of draft
violence and hotbeds for Molly Maguireism in the 1860s.174 Victims of the first wave consisted
of mine owners and superintendents, arguably legitimate targets in the eyes of the Molly
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Maguires and part of a loosely organized pattern of resistance to employers and state authorities
in the context of the wartime emergency.175 Wartime overproduction of anthracite coal led to
mass shutdowns of the collieries of Northern Schuylkill County. In the fall of 1866, the New
York and Schuylkill Coal Company shut down their Forestville mine for a few weeks and
continued to talk about further shutdowns for financial reasons. The company needed to pay a
mortgage and the price of coal continued to fall forcing the coal company to eventually close all
mines except for the Black Heath in Cass Township. By June 1866, bankruptcy forced the New
York and Schuylkill to cease operations altogether and sell all its assets. As a result, many
miners migrated to the middle coal fields to towns like Girardville, Shenandoah, and Mahanoy
City in the Northern part of Schuylkill County.176 Several men who became Molly leaders in the
first half of the 1870s were a fraction of those miners who were driven out of Cass Township
after the Civil War. Patrick Tully left for the middle coal fields in the fall of 1865 as result of
blacklisting and so too did Michael Lawler, a deserting draftee, in January of 1868. Other future
leaders of the AOH including Pat Hester and Barney Dolan also found their way to the middle
coal fields.177
In an attempt to explain the demise of the first wave of Molly activity, historians have
also pointed to a cultural clash between Irish immigrants trying to recreate the Irish peasant way
of life in the mine patches of Schuylkill County and second-generation Irish-Americans
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attempting to assimilate. The younger generation of Irish-American miners turned their back on
the more violent peasant mind-set that the Molly Maguires represented. In a way, the Molly
Maguires turned their backs on West Branch as they fled wartime military occupation, postwar
purges of union militants, and unemployment. This new generation viewed unionism, namely the
WBA as a vehicle through which they could incorporate into American culture. Mark Bulik
wrote:
Their language was English, not Irish. Their music was the regimen of a band,
not a freewheeling fiddle. Their hero was not a mythical Irishwoman, but a very
real neighbor, John Welsh, a Civil War veteran who had taken a leading role in
the union, which saw as one of its prime responsibilities the elevation of the
miners’ intellectual life.178
Inter-cultural clashes also formed between Irish immigrants from County Kilkenny, Ireland and
Irish mine workers who hailed from north-central and northwestern Ireland. “Kilkennyman” was
another name for “experienced mine worker” and in turn, placed the interethnic feud into the
larger context of the labor conflict that plagued the anthracite region as a whole. Kilkenny was
known for its anthracite mines, so many Kilkenny immigrants arrived with experience and skills.
These skills allowed them to assimilate faster and more quickly claim the labor hierarchy. These
skilled miners may have pushed the less desired unskilled laborers out of West Branch. This
marked a poignant transition from “shovel wielding peasant to American industrial worker,”
with the Molly Maguires at the center of this transition.179 Only with the end of the Long Strike
and the subsequent demise of the WBA was new life breathed into the Molly Maguire
movement.
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The post-Long Strike Molly Maguire violence still resembled the methodology and
traditions of the Civil War violence and, in turn, the agrarian violence in Ireland. Of the sixteen
men assassinated between 1862 and 1875, only one was a mine owner. Agrarian violence in
Ireland rarely targeted the land owner and instead victimized land agents, middlemen, small
farmers, and figures of local authority. Land owners as well as mine owners were mostly
absentees and rarely seen, therefore it proved easier to go after those with whom the perpetrators
had regular contact: mine superintendents, local officials, and people from their own social
background who treated them unjustly.180 The American Mollies certainly drew on the traditions
of retributive justice and methodology of their ancestors, but their struggle was their own and not
a continuation of the agrarian struggle in Ireland. This was made more evident through the
second wave of Molly Maguire activity in the 1870s.
Molly Maguireism of the 1870s was a very specific type of retributive justice, unique to
the labor relations that developed out of the destruction of unionism and the Long Strike. There
was a notably the higher concentration of assassinations immediately after the Long Strike as
compared to the relatively more scattered assassinations in the years before and during the strike.
The apparent dormancy of Molly Maguire activity between 1868 and 1873 when the WBA was
firmly established sparked the debate among historians over the question of whether they existed
at all, or if, at the time of the showcase trials and executions in the late 1870s, they had all but
disappeared from the area. Indeed, the victimology during the second wave reflected the
increased ethnic and labor tensions revitalized by the fall of the WBA. Welsh gang members,
miners, mine superintendents, and public officials all felt the wrath of Molly Maguireism, but the
strategy of revenge remained the same. Some participants in the Molly Maguire violence were
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not fighting for social justice in the broad sense of the term, but more for individual grievances.
However, this did not take away from the importance of what Molly Maguireism achieved. The
violence bore either a direct or indirect connection to labor relations—directly in the murders of
mine officials and more indirectly in the assassination of public officials and Welsh gang
members. Furthermore, the killing of Welsh gang members reflected interethnic conflicts and
ethnic discrimination patterns in the workplace.181
The two wave thesis aptly demonstrates that the highest concentrations of Molly Maguire
activity occurred when the WBA did not exist and again when the union failed. Therefore, not
only did Molly Magureism affect unionism, but unionism also affected Molly ideology. An
examination of the two waves of Molly Maguire violence also explains the migration of miners
from northern Schuylkill County to the middle coal fields and how the causes helped form the
motivations of Molly Maguire leadership in the 1870s. They sought revenge for the blacklisting
and unemployment forced upon them by the operators during the first wave.
Violence was conducted against the Molly Maguires as well as by them. This did not just
occur after the Long Strike, but began with the use of military force to put down draft violence
during the Civil War. Other examples included the general ethnic warfare between Welsh and
Irish gangs, police power directed at the private sector (i.e. the Coal and Iron Police), the
deployment of militia to put down labor disputes, the formation of vigilante committees in
Schuylkill County, and ultimately action by the state in the form of execution by hanging.182 The
struggle between these legal and extralegal forms of social justice that occurred in the anthracite
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region allowed for Molly Maguireism to replace unionism and redefined and molded Molly
Maguireism into a more formidable force that refused to die at the end of a rope.

The Informer: The Great Molly Maguire Trials, 1876-1879
The most concentrated amount of violence attributed to the Molly Maguires occurred
between October 1874 and September 1875. In just a short span of two months, the Molly
Maguires were blamed for six murders: Benjamin Yost, a Tamaqua policeman, was shot on July
5, 1875; Thomas Gwyther, a Girardville justice was killed that August; Gomer James, a
Welshman who was acquitted of the murder of an AOH member, Edward Cosgrove, was killed
in revenge; Mine boss Thomas Sanger was killed on September 3 along with his friend and
miner William Uren; John P. Jones, a Welsh mine superintendent, was killed the same day in
Lansford, Carbon County. During the ‘Great Molly Maguire Trials’ starting in 1876, the men
who would be charged for these murders became vehicles for railroad and coal baron Franklin
Gown to link Molly Maguirism with labor unionism.
Historians have debated McParlan’s role in the Sanger, Uren, and Jones murders. By the
time of the Yost assassination, McParlan had achieved a firm foothold within the Molly
Maguires as he had helped oust Michael “Muff” Lawlor as Shenandoah body master of the AOH
and replace him with Frank McAndrews. McAndrews could not read or write and quickly
appointed McParlan secretary of the Shenandoah lodge just three months after he had been
inducted into the AOH that April of 1874.183 Historians have debated James McParlan’s role in
the latter three murders listed above. James McParlan was born in 1844 in County Armagh in
Ulster province. He worked in a linen warehouse in Belfast and a chemical factory in Durham,
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England before he emigrated to America in 1867. He found employment in the grocer trade in
New York and later moved on to odd jobs in the Great Lakes region. Dewees described him as:
A man about five fee eight or nine inches in height, rather slightly built, but
muscular; is of fair complexion, with dark chestnut hair, regular features, a broad,
full forehead, and gray eyes. His general dress is a plain black suit; he wears
glasses, and presents a gentlemanly appearance…He is an Irishman in feeling and
sympathy as well as in race and resents quickly any unjust attack upon his
countrymen, his religion, or his native land.184
After working for a short time as a “preventative policeman” for a small detective agency in
Chicago, McParlan joined the Pinkerton National Detective Agency in 1871.185 His Irish
background allowed him to convincingly infiltrate the Mollies and the AOH in 1874 when they
inducted him into the organization.
McParlan going by the alias James McKenna, spent two years in Schuylkill County
collecting evidence against the Mollies while working at the Indian Ridge Shaft at Shenandoah.
The Shenandoah chapter of the AOH initiated McParlan on April 14, 1874, after which he
meticulously reported to his handler in Philadelphia, Benjamin Franklin, that he observed and
participated in the planning of several Molly killings. McParlan detailed one such instance on
Thursday, April 30, 1874:
After taking a drink and looking around they quietly and singly dropped out the
back way either up stairs in a bed room or down into the cellar so that any
stranger in the saloon would never suspect a mutiny being on the [unknown
word]. That when there is a “job” to be done (man to be beaten or murdered) the
question or matter is never brought up in open Lodge, but the Body Master
receives the grievance and complaint and appoints the man or men privately and
secretly notifies them of what they are required to do and thus the “job” is done
and the very members of the Lodge are never made aware of the transaction…
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The report further explained that this methodology enabled members to create reasonable doubt
and “always prove an alibi.”186
Contemporaries like Dewees and Pinkerton put McParlan on a pedestal. He represented
the hero, a force of good who helped defeat the evil Molly Maguires. Dewees depended strongly
on McParlan’s testimonies during the showcase trials of 1876 and presented it as irrefutable fact.
He was convinced that McParlan had conducted due diligence and that everything he did, or did
not do, was for the sake of collecting evidence to bring down “the terrorism which the Molly
Maguires had inspired,” and from which he barely escaped.187
By the 1920s and 1930s, historians began to question the existence of the Molly
Maguires. They surmised that Gowen and the railroad created the organization as a fear tactic to
destroy unionism in the anthracite industry. Anthony Bimba wrote his history within this context.
Bimba argued the Pinkerton detectives acted as vehicles through which Gowen abolished the
WBA and made the conspiracy of the Molly Maguires more convincing. He referred to the
Pinkerton detectives as “labor spies” and “provocateurs” marking the first time a historian
described McParlan as an agent provocateur, an agitator who purposely provokes crime. Bimba
was not completely wrong in his classification as the Pinkerton agency was known for
dispatching its men to spy on workingmen and prevent strikes.188 Bimba chipped away at the
pedestal that historians like Dewees had constructed by concluding that McParlan functioned as
another cog in the evil Railroad machine and that he was a provocateur only to the extent that he
would rather get an innocent man convicted than testify to save him.189 Bimba challenged
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McParlan’s hero status stating that he became a hero only after he took the witness stand durng
the Molly Maguire trials.190
The categorization of McParlan as an agent provocateur dominated Molly Maguire
historiography until Wayne G. Broehl began to question its validity. Broehl re-examined
McParlan’s testimony during the trials in an attempt to redefine McParlan’s role through the use
of his own words as well as to interpret the intention of the defense. The Molly defense attorneys
tried to implicate McParlan on the grounds that he became the de facto body master of the
Shenandoah lodge and thus responsible for planning and executing at least three killings during
his tenure:
Q. Did you fix a time for that meeting and tell them where you would meet them.
Recollect now that you were the chief man; you are body master from this time out?
A. [McParlan] That may be your impression, but I did not even fix the time. I had not the
authority even for that.
Q. Yes, you had. You too us in your examination-in-chief that Kehoe told you to go and
call a meeting?
A. [McParlan] I told you…that Kehoe told me to go home and notify they members.
Q. Yes, that is it?
A. [McParlan] Well, notifying the members and calling a meeting are not altogether the
same thing. I had not the authority to call a meeting.191
The defense continued to attack McParlan for neglecting to notify Captain Linden even after he
knew about the planned Sanger-Uren and Jones killings.
Broehl’s contemporary, Harold Aurand, agreed that it was uncertain as to whether
McParlan and his colleagues functioned as labor spies in order to establish a connection between
the WBA and the Molly Maguires. Aurand also hypothesized that the agent provocateur
argument originated with the relentless efforts of the defense during the trials. Aurand
recognized the trials and McParlan’s investigation served a larger purpose and McParlan was
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simply a player in Franklin B. Gowen’s larger war against unionism. The Pinkerton detective’s
testimony helped make the trial about an entire group instead of just a few offenders. Aurand
pointed out that other terror groups like the Modocs or the “Chain Gang” existed in the coal
fields, but Gowen ordered Pinkerton, and in turn, McParlan to focus on just the Mollies. The
Molly Maguires were different in that they held wider notoriety than these other groups. Gowen
sought to identify the union as a secret terrorist group and Aurand argued that arrests and
conviction of the organization’s members vindicated Gowen’s failure in his previous position as
district attorney of Schuylkill County.192
The trials reflected Gowen’s need to support his claim that the same secret society was to
blame for both crime waves before and after the Long Strike. Aurand concluded that Gowen
used the trials to prove the WBA and the secret society were one and the same in order to bring
unionism to a screeching halt in the coal fields. The Molly Maguire story became more about
Gowen’s personal success rather than a fight of good against evil. Even larger, it symbolized a
new order - a society dominated by corporations.193
Kevin Kenny steered McParlan’s historiography in a different direction. He sought to not
only chip away at McParlan’s historical pedestal, but to knock it down entirely. Kenny felt that
McParlan’s exploits have been exaggerated by past historians. However, he seemed to somewhat
agree with Aurand that McParlan was just a player in Gowen’s monopoly game. The Molly
Maguires threatened Gowen’s campaign to impose order and stability to the lower anthracite
region. Kenny admitted that McParlan may have been an agent provocateur, but his most
important role was that of informer. Molly Maguireism’s most defining characteristic was
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secrecy which meant that turning informer and betraying one’s colleagues became a capital
offense. Informers held a very ignoble place in Irish history. In rural Ireland, informers received
the most severe punishment: beating, mutilation, or death.194
The most recent Molly Maguire historian, Mark Bulik, back-pedaled on Kenny’s
arguments and rehashed the possibility of McParlan as an agent provocateur. He emphasized
three points. First, the Molly murders had been reduced to a little more than a memory when
McParlan arrived in the northern coal fields. Second, within months of McParlan being inducted
into the AOH, many Hibernian leaders who had kept the violence in check were removed.
Finally, these leaders were replaced by men more willing to spill blood. Bulik contended that
even if McParlan was not an agent provocateur, he certainly was an agent of change who, in the
effort to elevate himself in the AOH, created a “domino effect that contributed to the
violence.”195 Bulik believed the key lied in McParlan’s relationship with Frank McAndrew.
Bulik sought to rebuild McParlan’s historical pedestal somewhat by insinuating that the
Pinkertons succeeded in breaking up the Molly Maguires.196 By focusing on McParlan’s role in
the Mollies’ demise, Bulik failed to give Gowen the credit that other historians had before him.
Historians, therefore, have portrayed McParlan in varied, often contradictory terms: as a
hero, an agent provocateur, an overrated pawn in Franklin B. Gowen’s vendetta against the
Molly Maguires, or perhaps something in between. The representation of the Molly Maguires as
inherently evil Irishmen brought to justice by the heroic exploits of James McParlan and Allan
Pinkerton’s detectives dominated pamphlets, newspapers, and local histories at the time (i.e.
Dewees and Pinkerton’s book). Whether McParlan truly acted as agent provocateur still remains
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unproven. The fact that the second wave of intense Molly Maguire violence occurred shortly
after McParlan’s arrival in Schuylkill County, and that McParlan clearly knew about at least
three of them, and may have participated in at least one, is compelling. However, nowhere in his
reports or his testimony does he explicitly admit he was actively involved. Did he lie in his
reports or perjure himself on the witness stand? Analysis of the evidence did not make this
certain as many other factors were at play to bring about a second wave of Molly violence.
The collapse of the WBA dispossessed miners of their main vehicle for bargaining
collectively and fighting for better wages and working conditions in an organized and relatively
peaceful manner; as a result, the AOH leadership could no longer contain the violence and
frustration of the rank and file. John Kehoe and Frank McAndrews replaced men who up until
that point kept retributive justice in check. Historians contended McParlan had something to do
with this shift in leadership. Whether he directly instigated the change or his ambitions as a labor
spy had adverse effects is unknown. What is certain is that his testimony at the trials would make
him a central protagonist in future histories of the Molly Maguires. And yet, historians have
perhaps focused too much on the agent provocateur debate and on McParlan’s exploits to bring
down the Molly Maguires from the inside. And they have paid far too little attention to what he
was hired to do in the first place and the effects it had on the evolution of Molly Maguireism and
unionism, as well as the role of McParlan served in Gowen’s larger plans.
Throughout his time as President of the Reading and Philadelphia Railroad, Gowen
presented himself as a champion of labor and masked his desire for a monopoly as a mission to
eliminate the middle men and lower the cost of coal for the masses. When Gowen met with
Pinkerton in October of 1873, he referred to the Molly Maguires as an infestation and a “noxious

108
weed.”197 Gowen constantly utilized Molly Maguireism to justify taking control of coal
production. In July of 1875, the Reading and Philadelphia underwent one of several state led
investigations that occurred during Gowen’s tenure. This particular investigation called into
question the detention of cars, short weights, unfair distribution of cars, and conspiracy to control
production.198 The railroad became part of the rise of the company state as it maintained the
prices it wanted through pooling combinations with other corporations.
Gowen supplemented his economic might with muscle from the Coal and Iron Police and
the undercover Pinkerton detectives. Further, the Reading and Philadelphia railroad gained
influence over state politics and the governor. By 1876, as Wallace writes,
the Reading system…held and unchallenged, near-perfect monopoly of the
Schuylkill coal trade. It produced most of the coal in its own collieries, carried all
of it on its own railroads or its own canal, delivered it at Port Richmond to its own
wharves, ships, and dealers.199
The power wielded by the railroad came to bear in front of the state legislature in an
investigation in July 1875 where Gowen, defending himself and his company, quickly deflected
the committee’s attention away from the corporation and onto Molly Maguireism.200 During his
testimony at the investigation, Gowen, after first illustrating the patriotic and altruistic designs
of his company in the first half of his testimony, attacked unionism using Molly Maguireism as
a scapegoat. A skillful manipulator, Gowen presented himself as a labor rights activist stating,
“I stand here as the champion of the rights of labor - as the advocate of those who desire to
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work and who have been prevented from doing so.” He blamed the Molly Maguires for causing
unnecessary unrest in the mines, claiming that, before they were on the scene, miners were
satisfied with wages and hours and working peaceably. Gowen then produced a ten page “List
of Outrages in Schuylkill and Shamokin Region, from December 13, 1874 to July 15, 1875” as
well as his collection of coffin notices that were posted around the Schuylkill collieries from the
same period. He argued that these pieces of evidence showed existence of an effort to
“intimidate the workingmen themselves from going to work.”201 With that, Gowen convinced
the state legislature that the labor union and the Molly Maguires appeared as one. As the WBA
collapsed, he needed more evidence in order to convince the masses and destroy his final
perceived obstacle, Molly Maguireism.
James McParlan’s exploits have been well documented in the historiography, but always
in the context of his role in the Molly Maguire saga. McParlan clearly knew about the Sanger
killing at least the morning of August 31, 1875 when Mike Doyle confessed his plans to the
operative. He did not notify Benjamin Franklin until September 2, after the murder of Sanger
and Uren took place. He also failed to act after the plan to kill Jones came to light. However,
reports revealed that the Pinkertons knew of the plan in advance. On July 31, McParlan reported
that “the Summit Hill assassination has been postponed.” And a later report read, “Jones is the
boss who will be assassinated, but it has been postponed until the last of the month, and after the
Molly Maguire convention which is to be held at Tamaqua, on the 25th inst.”202 McParlan’s
lack of action in order to accumulate evidence reflected the strength of Gowen’s desire to bring
the Molly Maguires to justice.
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The Molly Maguire trials that began in January 1876 were an example of one of the
most blatant acts of injustice in Pennsylvania history. Private policemen arrested the defendants
and the prosecution convicted them on the evidence of a detective accused of being an agent
provocateur and informers who wanted to save their own skin. Most of the prosecuting
attorneys worked for the railroads and mining companies, including Franklin B. Gowen and
Charles Albright. Gowen was the star prosecutor in Pottsville and Charles Albright, the scourge
of the Buckshots and Mollies during the Civil War, was now lawyer for the Lehigh and WilkesBarre Coal Company. Francis Hughes, a Schuylkill County Democratic leader during the war,
had become a lawyer for the Reading Company, and he, too, served on the prosecution. Judge
Pershing, the Democratic candidate for governor in 1875, and a political enemy of John
Kehoe’s, presided over many of the trials, including Kehoe’s. As Aurand aptly put it: “The
Molly Maguire investigation and trials marked one of the most astounding surrenders of
sovereignty in American history. A private corporation initiated the investigation through a
private detective agency, a private police force arrested the supposed offenders, and coal
company attorneys prosecuted - the state provide only the courtroom and hangman.”203
The idea of McParlan as an agent provocateur was not realized until the defense
painstakingly attempted to implicate him as such and the question was raised repeatedly during
several of the trials including the Yost trial, the Jones trial, and the Thomas conspiracy trial. In
the Sanger-Uren murder trial the defense asked McParlan why he made no effort to save the
men’s lives, to which he responded, “in doing so, I ran the danger of losing my life.” He
continued:
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I devised every plan I could to telegraph Captain Linden, or telegraph the Agency
to find out whether Captain Linden was in Shenandoah - of course he was not, I
did not know it then…If I could have found Linden, and he had got his men
stationed there, the probabilities are that the boss’ life might have been saved, but
those things were impossible.204
Again, during the Jones case, when asked why he did not save Jones’ life he bluntly stated, “My
reason was that I was afraid of being assassinated myself.”205 The defense remained unswayed
by McParlan’s claim that he was unable to inform authorities or save any of the victims for fear
of his safety. As the defense argued:
He did not answer that question as an intelligent and candid man would have
answered, but he answered it in a manner that clearly shows he designed to evade
all questions as to the motives which prompted him upon that occasion. If, then, it
would amount to nothing to catch them in the act, with McParlan’s lips sealed,
unless they were caught after the murder was committed, then the arrangement
McParlan swears to about catching parties in the act, was to let them kill their
man first, and then arrest them afterwards. This would seem too inhuman to
become the subject of a contract, and I do not believe such was the intention.206

The local papers added to the speculation. During the Yost trial, the Pottsville Workingman
made the point that the amount of violent crime appeared much less in the seven years before
McParlan arrived in the coal fields than after, when eight murders occurred under his watch.
The newspaper questioned McParlan’s role and whether he was sent to instigate these violent
crimes or simply gather evidence.207
When it came to the Jones assassination, McParlan made no effort to contact Captain
Linden. The defense accused him of being an accessory before the fact. McParlan rebutted,
“Jones had been notified and was on his guard.” McParlan notified his handler Benjamin
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Franklin of the anticipated murder on July 17 and Franklin sent agents to guard Jones’ home
and workplace during the day. McParlan reasoned that he could not notify Tamaqua police
because Pinkerton placed him under strict orders to only answer to Franklin or Linden and if
he would have informed anyone else, his cover would have been blown and his life in
danger.208
The trials offered McParlan more notoriety than he deserved and historians
perpetuated this long after they ended. In reality, he was a hired detective turned informer
whose gathered evidence and testimony served a more complex purpose. The prosecution’s
case relied heavily on the informers’ testimony. McParlan also was not the only informer to
take the witness stand. Jimmy Kerrigan, whose wife denounced him as a turncoat, called him
“a dirty little rat” from the witness stand and refused to visit him in prison, also took the
stand.209 In addition to Kerrigan, at least nine other Mollies turned on their brothers and
testified for the prosecution. Daniel Kelly freely admitted he was an accessory in the murder
of Alexander Rea and gave Captain Linden a lengthy confession to save his own skin; Frank
McHugh turned state’s evidence in the Thomas conspiracy case; Patrick Butler in the Gomer
James conspiracy case; Michael Lawler in the Sanger-Uren case; Charles Mulhearn and John
J. Slattery in the Major conspiracy case; and Cornelius T. McHugh in the Morgan Powell
case. After the mass executions in 1877, Dennis Cannon turned informer and received formal
pardon in exchange for testifying against Dennis Donnelly in November 1877. James
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McDonnell, who was sentenced to death, helped convict Martin Bergin of the murder of
Patrick Burns, but failed to get his own sentence commuted.210
If not for men like Jimmy Kerrigan and Daniel Kelly (aka “Kelly the Bum”),
McParlan’s testimony would have been thrown out. The defense questioned the validity of
evidence provided by the informers repeatedly and argued that McParlan’s testimony should
be discounted on the grounds that he instigated several of the Molly Maguire crimes. This
argument proved formidable given the complicity of the other informers. Fortunately for the
detective, the jury believed his version of events and the defense failed to persuade them
otherwise.211
When he took the stand for the first time in May 1876, McParlan presented the AOH
and the Molly Maguires as one and the same. Through the trials he revealed the inner
workings of the secret society and helped to establish Molly Maguireism as a widespread
conspiracy; in the process, he elevated himself as a detective. McParlan described his early
movements in the anthracite region, his initiation into the Shenandoah Hibernians, the system
of passwords and grips, the organizational network, and the trading of “jobs” between the
different branches on a reciprocal basis. McParlan’s detailed accounts during the Thomas,
Yost, and Munley trials along with the prosecution’s rousing speeches on the Molly Maguire
conspiracy further solidified its truth with the jurors and the community.
McParlan’s revelations also made good press. National and local newspapers reported
the trials with hysterical zeal. For example, the Miners’ Journal denounced the Molly
Maguires as “lawless wretches” who in pursuit of their “diabolical crimes” had thrown aside
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all restraint, all respect of the law and for the opinion of mankind…and given themselves up
to the unrestrained indulgence of their own passions.”212 The Shenandoah Herald referred to
the Mollies as “scum” and warned that “the time was close at hand” when they would be
“swept from the face of the earth.”213 The Herald also announced, “Death to all ‘Mollies’ is
the cry from one end of the coal region to the other, and never let it be silent until the devilish
order is irretrievably dismembers and its members scattered.” For the Molly Maguires,
“murder was but child’s play, arson but a pleasure, and wickedness of all kinds but the natural
outpourings of vile and devilish hearts.”214 More metropolitan newspapers also showed no
mercy. “When the inner history of the Mollie Maguires shall have been written, it will
embody the harrowing details of a conspiracy such as the world has rarely known,” the
Philadelphia Inquirer proclaimed on May 20, 1876. “This history has been making itself
through years of lawlessness, bloodshed, plundering general anarchy.” 215 In much the same
vein, the New York Times announced:
the revelations of the doings of the Mollie Maguires…uncover a state of brutish
ignorance and superstition which one might think could not exist in this Republic.
The Pennsylvania authorities owe it to civilization to exterminate this noxious
growth, now that its roots have been discovered.216
Franklin B. Gowen gave some of his most theatrical speeches on the conspiracy during
these trials. He drew heavily on W. Steuert Trench’s Realities of Irish Life and claimed the
AOH existed for the sake of crime, profit, and power. “The purpose was to make the business
of mining coal in this country a terror and a fear; to secure for the leading men in this society
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profitable positions, and the control of …every colliery.” Left unchecked, the society would
infiltrate all corners of the anthracite region. It only had “five or six hundred” members in
Schuylkill County, but, Gowen asserted, it would have been twenty or thirty thousand had
they succeeded in their mission of infiltration of the coal industry.217 Gowen also imparted his
powers of manipulation and theatrics upon the point that mere membership in the AOH
proved evidence of guilt by association. For example, in the Yost trial, he asserted that “every
member of that organization is, not only in a court of conscience, but in the eyes of the law,
guilty of every murder as an accessory before the fact and liable to be convicted and hanged
by the neck until he is dead.”218
At the outset, Gowen sought to use the trials as a platform to convince the anthracite
community as well as the court that the Molly Maguires essentially were the WBA and the
AOH. However, the prosecution failed to build a convincing case that the secret society was
somehow strong enough to be behind both organizations. By the time of the trials, the trade
union had effectively collapsed; its collapse resulted in an increase in Molly violence as
opposed to the society’s disappearance. So the prosecutors took a different route and put forth
the theory that the AOH actually was the Molly Maguires, but under a different name. This
incriminated any Irishman who claimed membership in the AOH and the organization’s
reputation suffered tremendously.219 The only way Gowen could ultimately eliminate Molly
Maguireism from the anthracite region was to prove it was a part of something greater, more
material and visible in the region. McParlan’s testimony as well as that of the other informers,
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forced the trials to take a new turn. Now the AOH, an international ethnic fraternal
organization, members of which were accused of terrorizing the coal regions during the Civil
War, was on trial.
The great Molly Maguire trials, which ended in August 1878, allowed the coal
establishment to finally take back control over coal production and snuff out the idea of
unionism, retributive justice, or any other voice that cried out on behalf of the miners and
laborers in the anthracite region. When the railroad wrapped up the cases pertaining to the
second wave of Molly violence, they moved on to older cases from the first wave during the
Civil War era, sometimes because new evidence emerged, other times because the cases
offered a convenient excuse to hang an inconvenient Irishman.220 John Kehoe’s trial, the very
last of the great Molly trials described in the first chapter of this thesis, fell into this category.
In the minds of the prosecution team and the jurors, Kehoe’s conviction directly linked the
secret society active during the Civil War to the conspiracy the coal companies uncovered
after the war.221
Locally, the trials ostracized the Molly Maguires from the two crucial components of
their immigrant, working-class community: the trade union movement and the Catholic
Church. As the trials progressed, the union leaders increasingly condemned the Molly
Maguires and vigorously dissociated the union from the secret organization. During the trials,
John Siney openly expressed the essential differences between trade unionism and Molly
Maguireism. He published a letter in the Philadelphia Times on May 26, 1876 in an attempt to
denounce the secret society and separate it from the miners’ union and the mass of ordinary
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Irish workers. He pointed out that the union had always been, “an open organization without
either signs, grip, or password.” Siney insisted that most Catholics condemned secret societies
as the church taught and shunned the Molly Maguires.222 Archbishop James Frederic Wood of
Philadelphia issued the formal excommunication of the Molly Maguires, published in the New
York Times on December 23, 1875 in response to the infamous events at Wiggins Patch. In
August 1875, Alan Pinkerton resorted to desperate measures in order to bring the Molly
Maguires to justice. His agents drew up a list of names, addresses, and ranking in the AOH of
suspected Mollies involved in the murder of Benjamin Yost and his wife and addressed the
list to “The Vigilance Committee of the Anthracite Coal Region.” On that list, amongst others,
were names of the members of two families, the O’Donnells and the McAllisters. Both
families resided in Wiggins Patch, a small mining patch near Mahanoy City. Three family
members were also named as the assassins in the Sanger and Uren killings. On December 10,
1875, thirty masked men broke into the O’Donnell and McAllister house and indiscriminately
slaughtered most of their family; some managed to escape including alleged Mollies, James
O’Donnell and Charles McAllister.223 By the time of the trials, the Molly Maguires had
become pariahs of union leaders and the Catholic Church.224
Prior to the trials, Gowen attempted to connect unionism and the Molly Maguires and
create an anti-labor attitude in the coal region. During the trials, the procedure and publicity
surrounding them sought to present the Mollies as a criminal conspiracy opposed to the true
interests of labor. The Philadelphia Inquirer made the distinction that, “Siney’s organization
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made the fight on capital, while the Mollie Maguires made war on labor.” The Pottsville
Workingman supported this opinion: “the best conservator of the peace that ever existed in the
country, was the miners’ Union.” There was few “bad and restless characters” in Schuylkill
County, “but these men were mainly not Union men, not even in sympathy with labor or its
trials.”225
This idea that Molly Maguireism amounted to a criminal conspiracy against labor
influenced contemporary historians who perpetuated it as historic truth. More accurately,
these “bad and restless characters” fought for the workingmen’s cause just with more violent
means. The Molly Maguires cannot be dissociated with labor activism as it deprives them of
any motive other than revenge and blood lust. Most of their victims were mine officials who
were killed as part of a larger struggle to regulate conditions of life and labor in the mines on
an individual and local as well as collective and regional level. More specific evidence can be
gleaned from the coffin notices posted in the collieries during both waves of Molly Maguire
violence. Some coffin notices were sent to individuals and meant to threaten them directly.
Mollies posted other notices in the collieries for all miners to see, discouraging them from
returning to work while a strike was underway until the operators met all the miners’
demands. The men blamed for posting these notices clearly were in sympathy with the trials
of labor, albeit via more drastic measures.
The trials were crucial to the history of labor relations in the region. First, they
separated the Molly Maguires and the WBA specifically, but forever linked Molly
Maguireism to labor and unionism. Gowen effectively used Molly Maguireism and the fear it
produced to remove the last obstacle standing in the way of his monopoly over the anthracite
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mines. The trials allowed him to prove his theory that the Molly Maguires were part of a
larger labor, Irish, and political conspiracy and to convince the Schuylkill community to be
anti-labor and anti-Molly Maguire through fear. Through the evidence presented by McParlan
and the other informers, Gowen’s career-long theory became reality. However, the trials failed
to tie the murders to specific incidences of union activity. They also failed to link the AOH
and the WBA. However, the “Great Molly Maguire Trials” did succeed in turning the AOH, a
well-known, international secret society into the Molly Maguires. Despite the incredible
nature of this claim, the prosecution and Gowen convinced the jurors and the press of the
connection, thus putting the entire order on trial.
Second, the “Great Molly Maguire Trials” transformed a localized secret society into a
national spectacle. Through the trials, Molly Maguireism spread outside of the anthracite
region and connected the labor struggles of the anthracite industry in Schuylkill and Carbon
counties to the larger labor wars occurring in more metropolitan areas like Philadelphia and
New York in the 1870s. Some workers outside the anthracite region criticized the outcome of
the trials. The week of Kehoe’s conviction, workingmen in New York, for example,
denounced the press as a patsy of the mine owners and condemned the prosecution of the Irish
miners. The headline in the Miners’ Journal read, “New York Workingmen Making Asses of
Themselves.” In Philadelphia, workers met in protest of the Mollies’ conviction and
concluded that, “the people were fast drifting into a condition where revolution would be
necessary” to defend their rights against monopoly.226 Even though publicity and hostility
surrounded the trials locally, workingmen in more metropolitan areas who discovered the
Mollies’ plight empathized with their struggle and were vocal in their support.
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Out of the trials, Franklin Gowen, and by proxy James McParlan and the Pinkerton
Detective Agency, emerged as the heroes, while and the Molly Maguires, the AOH, and labor
were stigmatized as villains and enemies. Newspapers, pamphlets, and historians perpetuated
these historical profiles and rigorously questioned them. McParlan in particular was not as
important as some historians presented him. He was one of several Pinkerton detectives hired
by Gowen to gather evidence against unionism and the Molly Maguires. The great trials made
McParlan a notable figure in the Molly Maguire saga, but his testimony and evidence would
have been less meaningful without other secret society members turning informer. By
investigating the role of McParlan as an undercover Pinkerton detective and his role during
the trials, one can glean an understanding of Gowen’s motives and what effect the rise of the
corporate monopoly had on unionism in the anthracite region.
***
As industrial consciousness replaced peasant consciousness, the WBA (and later the
M&LBA) became a space for collective bargaining and ethnic unity. Its rise and success
rendered the Molly Maguire’s style of resistance unnecessary. The fact that the frequency of
Molly Maguire activity coincided with the rise and fall of the WBA confirmed that the secret
society was not just a group of thugs who vandalized and murdered because it was in their
Irish nature to do so. Clearly Irish miners and laborers preferred the opportunity of collective
action that the WBA offered or the killings would have continued during the life of the union.
When the WBA fell, the Molly Maguires came out of dormancy. They recognized Gowen and
his growing monopoly and its suppression of unionism as a threat to their rights as workers
and their new found way of collective bargaining. The decrease in Molly violence after 1868
cannot be understood outside the context of the rise (and subsequent fall) of the WBA;
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therefore, Molly Maguireism cannot be completely divorced from unionism in the anthracite
region.
The failings and ultimate collapse of the WBA was just one factor in bringing about
the second wave of Molly Maguire activity. More radical leadership breathed new life into the
Molly Maguire cause as John Kehoe took Barney Dolan’s place as AOH body master of
Schuylkill County and lead delegate, and Frank McAndrew as body master of Shenandoah.
Whether James McParlan had anything to do with the shift has been debated by historians
with no definitive conclusion. However, by unscrupulously gathering evidence for the railroad
company, he certainly was an agent of change within the Molly Maguires who unscrupulously
gathered evidence for the railroad company.
By February 1877, the highly publicized trials resulted in the conviction of all the
leading suspects; the jury sent fifteen men to death row in Pottsville, Bloomsburg, and Mauch
Chunk.227 On April 16, John Kehoe, “King of the Mollies,” was also found guilty of firstdegree murder and sentenced to hang. However, the struggle did not end at sentencing. Three
of the cases, Carroll’s, Campbell’s, and Duffy’s went to the Supreme Court at which the lower
courts’ rulings were enforced. Friends and family of the condemned sent in a stream of letters
to the Pennsylvania Pardons Board asking for mercy, but all were in vain. The first ten
condemned men were scheduled for execution on June 21, 1877, six at Pottsville and four at
Mauch Chunk.228 Gowen and the anthracite community hoped that the Molly Maguires were
broken and their executions would motivate a more formidable form of law and order in the
coal fields. However, as Dewees pointed out, a lingering feeling of fear that members of the
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order who did not suffer conviction would seek vengeance on those who had wronged their
compatriots remained in the coal region. Dewees believed that the lives of the informers like
McParlan and Kerrigan were in danger and that even though the organization was broken,
others were still at large.229 This observation provided insight into the influence of Molly
Maguireism after the trials and executions. The alleged leading members of the organization
may have died, but their legacy, their ideals, and the fear they induced endured and continued
to evolve.
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION: THE EXECUTIONS OF 1877-1879 AND THE MYTHICAL LEGACY
OF MOLLY MAGUIREISM
In 1834, the Pennsylvania legislature abolished public executions and required
hangings to occur within the privacy of the jail walls. Despite the writ of privacy, the Molly
Maguire executions were public spectacles where a few hundred citizens were granted the
privilege of attending, while thousands more congregated outside the jail walls. The drama
was exacerbated by the armed troops and policemen who kept guard and paraded the streets of
Pottsville and Mauch Chunk. Also, advances in printing technology made newspapers less
expensive, allowing for these private events to be published in vivid detail for a wider
audience than ever before. Every aspect of the Molly Maguire executions was exhaustively
reported in the press, popular pamphlets, and histories throughout the United States.
Poignantly, it was arranged for the first ten executions to take place on a single day, June 21,
1877, known locally as Black Thursday. Several newspapers marked the day as one where the
majesty of the law had been vindicated. The executions, like the trials, proclaimed triumph of
order over anarchy and reinforced the notion that the Molly Maguires represented a great
criminal conspiracy.230 The discourse and ritual that accompanied the executions further
solidified the myth of the Molly Maguires and redefined Molly Maguireism.
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Black Thursday
In the days leading up to the executions, the citizens of the anthracite region were
inundated with the machinations of preparation. People could see the extra police in the
streets, hear the sounds of the gallows being constructed in the prison yard as they walked by
the walls, and read the newspapers filled with maps of the prisons, sketches of gallows, and
detailed histories of the crimes of the Molly Maguire crimes.231 The jails constructed special
gallows that could hang multiple men at once. The elaborate structures, as one pamphlet
described, were designed to “prevent a protraction of the horrible affair by hanging six
murderers at once.”232 The Miners’ Journal reported, “The scaffold is in place and ready for
its ghastly work. It was viewed yesterday afternoon by 500 and 600 people…Viewed in the
pale light of the moon last night and with the full knowledge of the work it is designed to do
today, it was an object to chill the blood of the observer and to bring home to him a realization
of what this day will bring forth.”233
The four Mauch Chunk prisoners were executed first. At four o’clock in the morning,
four Catholic priests arrived at the prison to hear their confessions and administer last
communion; those in attendance were Father Bunce of Mauch Chunk, Father McIlhone of
Lawrytown, Father Heinan of East Mauch Chunk, and Father Wynne of Summit Hill. People
arrived by the train load from other parts of the country to gather outside the prison walls.
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Those authorized within the walls to bear witness included twenty-four jurors, eight deputies,
fifty journalists, and seventy local citizens privileged with entry permits.234
The four Mollies were paraded out to the gallows at 10:26 a.m., with Alexander
Campbell in the lead. As Alexander Campbell approached the gallows, he clasped his crucifix
in his hand and as he approached the rope, Father Bruce prayed for his condemned soul.
Michael Doyle was the second Molly Maguire to ascend the gallows. He took his place next
to Campbell. When asked if he had anything to say, Campbell asked for God’s forgiveness
and the forgiveness of his enemies. According to the Miners’ Journal, “Doyle’s words were
inaudible, therefore, there was no direct quotation, “Doyle hung his head and said something
that no one but those on the gallows caught.” The Journal speculated that the substance of
Doyle’s words was that he openly regretted joining a secret society against the teachings of
the church. John Donahue and Edward Kelly had similar lamentations.235
On June 22 and 23, the Miners’ Journal reported the first executions in Carbon County
in vivid detail. Once in their places, all four men knelt and received last rights and prayers for
the dying. After having been absolved of their sins, steel manacles were placed on their hands
and feet, ropes around their necks, and white hoods over their heads. “The prisoners were
praying earnestly when at a quarter of eleven o’clock the drop was sprung and in an instant
four figures were twisting and spinning around inside the four posts of the gibbet.”236 While
Doyle and Campbell died instantly, Donahue and Kelly suffered immensely. Donahue
“struggled for about thirty seconds, rattling his manacles by the rapid motions of his hands
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and feet.”237 Kelly, “drew his hands up on his left side” and “he also threw his fee forward
slightly, but for the balance of the time hung quietly.” Within two minutes, “the men hung
motionless, the four white caps appearing just above the place where the traps had rested.”238
The Miners’ Journal and the New York Herald further reported that the hanging rendered the
men unconscious, but it took six minutes for Donahue to die, eleven minutes for Kelly, Doyle
after thirteen, and Campbell after fifteen. The sheriffs cut the men down and placed them in
coffins measured for them days before and Coal and Iron Police were dispatched to the burial
places of each of the men. Thus ended the Mauch Chunk executions.239
Simultaneously, six alleged Molly Maguires were executed in Pottsville. The men
executed were Thomas Duffy, James Carroll, James Roarity, Hugh McGehan, James Boyle
and Thomas Munley. The crowd in attendance was vast. Spectators flooded the jail green as
well as the areas around the outside of the jail. About two hundred people had the privilege of
witnessing the executions directly, but, as the Miners’ Journal reported, “The hills around the
jail were full of those whose curiosity had led them thither.” Schuylkill County mine workers
ignored the Philadelphia & Reading Coal and Iron Company’s order to stay at work that day
and traveled to Pottsville to catch a glimpse of the proceedings.240
Despite the fact that the scaffold was specially constructed to hang all six prisoners at
once, it was decided to hang the men in pairs, presumably to intensify and extend the
theatrics: At 11:10 a.m., James Boyle and Hugh McGehan, James Carroll and James Roarity
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at 12:21 p.m., and Thomas Duffy and Thomas Munley at 1:20 p.m.241 After the bodies were
cut down, the guards allowed a crowd of spectators to flood into the yard and inspect the
scaffold. The Miners’ Journal estimated that three thousand people visited the prison yard that
afternoon.242 The bodies of the executed men were placed in ice boxes and transported to their
respective places of burial. Ironically, the Reading Railroad provided special trains to
transport the bodies and carry relatives and friends. All ten men were buried in Catholic
cemeteries even though Bishop Wood had excommunicated them for their crimes only two
years earlier.243
The most notable funeral proceedings were that of Alexander Campbell. Family and
friends held a boisterous wake conducted in the Irish language and featuring the Gaelic
practice of “keening,” a custom in which mourners lamented vocally over the body of the
deceased. Keening would also involve physical movements such as rocking, kneeling, or
clapping. The newspaperman who reported on the wake stated that all present immediately
switched to Irish once they realized his presence. Campbell’s wake was a small event that
provided some insight into the closed culture embodied by Molly Maguireism, from which
outsiders were excluded.244 Black Thursday symbolized the first step towards an attempt to
tame Molly Maguireism. Indeed, Molly Maguireism changed form after the executions; it
became myth.
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The Sons of Molly Maguire: The Myth
The term mythology is defined here as one theorist so aptly put it, “a process of
conveying meaning that denies history and creates a static world, closed to the possibility of
change; and related to this, a belief in essential, timeless categories of human nature, like
goodness and badness.”245 The history of the Molly Maguires has, until rather recently, been a
mythology, a reality devoid of history. Historians have been reluctant to place the Molly
Maguires in social and historical context, instead preserving their story in static categories of
good and evil.246 This myth created a circular discourse in which the Molly Maguires were
Irish and by definition savage thugs who killed for the sake of it and proof of this barbarism
lied in the simple fact that they committed these crimes. The Molly Maguire trials and
subsequent executions were more than a question of enforcing a specific vision of justice.
They also contributed to the development of the Molly Maguire myth and endurance of Molly
Maguireism.
During the trials and executions, Molly Maguireism strengthened in its association
with labor activism as well as a more radical alternative to the failings and discouragement of
collective bargaining and unionism. The press, like the Miners’ Journal, contemporary
pamphlets, and histories placed Molly Maguireism into a world of Irish barbarism where the
Mollies committed their crimes without legitimate motives. Three prevalent themes
dominated Molly rhetoric printed in the 1870s and 1880s: hyperbole, the inherent depravity of
criminals, and a struggle between order and disorder. For example, before their arrests, the
newspaper claimed, the Molly Maguires “dominated and terrorized the entire coal regions in
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this section of the commonwealth.” The Journal used words like “rabid dogs,” “bloodthirsty,” “obdurate and fiendish,” and unfit for “freedom” to describe the Molly Maguires in
an article published on June 22, 1877.247 The prosecution and Gowen used the trials to create
a massive conspiracy which the newspapers helped perpetuate well into the executions.
According to the Philadelphia Inquirer, the Molly Maguires were “the most relentless
combination of assassins that had been known in American history.” The Philadelphia Ledger
praised Black Thursday as “a day of deliverance from as awful a despotism of banded
murderers as the world has ever seen in any age.”248
The hyperbole and sensationalism created by the newspapers, pamphlets, and
prosecution lawyers soon became historical “facts.” Munsell’s History of Schuylkill County,
published in 1881 concluded that, “the history of this country does not record another instance
in which, by the ordinary processes of law, so great, and so wide-spread and so dangerous an
evil has been destroyed - so malignant a social cancer safely extirpated.”249 Munsell also
extensively quoted Dewees as the leading authority on the typical Molly Maguires. Dewees’s
description of the ideal Molly Maguire precisely illustrated the myth:
The Mollie Maguire of the coal region comes into existence without cause or
pretense of cause in the past or present history of this country. Standing the equal
before the law of any man or set of men in the land, his rights guarded and even
his prejudices respected, he becomes with fiendish malice and in cold blood in
incendiary and assassin; a curse to the land that has welcomed him with open
arms, and a blot, a stain and a disgrace upon the character of his countrymen and
the name of the land of his nativity.250
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To portray the Mollies as subhuman and intrinsically depraved dispensed with the need for a
historical explanation of how they originated and why they acted as they did. The New York
Herald described Kehoe, the alleged “King of the Mollies,” as such:
In fiction such a character would be regarded as not only unnatural but
impossible…A more terrible monster is not known in all the annals of crime, and
it would require the pen of De Quincey to depict his murders in all their shocking,
cold blooded and startling reality.251
To the chagrin of the Reading Coal and Iron Company, the mass hangings succeeded in
actually bolstering the labor movement in the anthracite region instead of extinguishing it. Henry
Pleasants reported the day before the hangings, “There is a general uneasiness at all the collieries
where there are Irish workmen. There will be little or no work tomorrow.” A week later, he
wrote, “They blame our company for the hanging of innocent men and their hatred for our
company is very great at present.” Pleasants' concerns were substantiated when from June 20 to
June 27, strikes crippled the Elmwood, Ellengowen, Knickerbocker, Mahanoy City, North
Mahanoy, and Shenandoah collieries.252
The renewed labor battles came to a head during the Great Railroad Strike of 1877. The
miners of Summit Hill, Alexander Campbell’s hometown, contributed by parading through the
streets, carrying bread on polls. It was meant as a symbol that hearkened back to the agrarian
riots against landlords in the Ulster borderlands, and poignantly illustrated the general
atmosphere amongst the Irish miners during the strike and the executions of their countrymen.253
What the New York Times called, “The Working Men’s War,” the Great Railroad Strike of 1877
spread from Baltimore to Scranton, Pittsburgh, St. Louis, and San Francisco in one of the
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bloodiest class conflicts the nation has ever known. Molly Maguireism reared its head in
Scranton on August 2 when a group of vigilantes killed two Irishmen after opening fire on a
crowd of strikers. Efforts to arrest the shooters were obstructed by the National Guard, which
embraced the vigilantes into their unit. Newspapers and state officials justified the killings by
accusing the victims of being “filled with the spirit of Molly Maguire” and suggested that they
may have been actual Mollies.254
Black Thursday was the climax of the railroad and coal companies’ campaign to
eradicate the Molly Maguires; that campaign continued on for another two years with five more
trials and ten more executions. By June 13, 1878 with the execution of Dennis Donnelly, the
newspapers started to lose interest in the Molly Maguires. The Miners’ Journal reported it under
the headline, “Hanging No Longer Attractive.”255 However, on the eve of the Kehoe case, the
fickle press followed every twist and turn as he fought to save his life. John Kehoe was hanged
in Pottsville prison yard in front of 150 people. Outside the walls, a crowd of several hundred,
“most of them by their appearance, miners and colliery laborers,” stood and “gazed in blank
curiosity at the walls.”256 The drop fell at 10:27. The attendant physicians pronounced death by
strangulation twelve minutes later. Kehoe’s body was taken home to Girardville for a wake
before being buried in Tamaqua next to his sister-in-law, Ellen McAllister O’Donnell, murdered
in Wiggans Patch two years earlier.257

254

New York Times, August 3, 9, 1877, September 9, 1877; Report of the Committee Appointed to
Investigate the Railroad Riots of July 1877, Pennsylvania General Assembly, Harrisburg, Pa, 30; Bulik,
Sons of Molly Maguire, 284.
255
MJ, June 14 1878.
256
Philadelphia Press, December 19, 1878; MJ, January 15, 1878.
257
Kenny, Making Sense of the Molly Maguires, 274.

132
“The Dawn of a New Era”
The people of the anthracite region wanted John Kehoe’s death to bring with it the death
of Molly Maguireism. The Miners’ Journal called it, “the dawn of a new era…Up to yesterday
Mollie Maguireism in this region was but scotched. Yesterday it was killed.”258 However, before
the Miners’ Journal’s new era could be realized, four more executions took place. Finally, by
October 1879, twenty Irishmen were in the grave and the Reading seemed to have finally
obtained a firm grasp on the anthracite industry. It gained a monopoly on the production of coal
in the lower anthracite region, suppressed the miners’ union, and exterminated the leadership of
the local Hibernian societies.259 Unfortunately, the Reading’s triumph proved to be a Pyrrhic one,
and Franklin B. Gowen the tragic hero.
By 1880, Gowen, unable to pay off the loans he took out to buy coal land, found himself
drowning in debt. The Reading went into receivership and Gowen was forced out as president
the following year. He failed to regain his previous reputation and success and finally gave up on
December 13, 1889. In what amounts to a sort of poetic justice, he secluded himself in his
Washington hotel room and killed himself, twenty-seven years to the day when strikers invaded
Phoenix Park shouting a name: Molly Maguire.260
The battle between the Molly Maguires and the Reading Coal and Iron Company was
lost, but the war between unionism and big business was not over. The mythology of the Molly
Maguires and their ideals and tradition rooted itself deep within the coal fields and patches of
Schuylkill County and beyond. With the eradication of the trade union and the Molly Maguires,
the men and women of the anthracite region sought out alternatives to improve the conditions in
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which they lived and worked. John Siney formed the “Greenback” or Independent political party
and served on its executive committee. The Greenback party ran on a third party ticket with an
anti-corporation, pro-labor platform. Siney also chaired an “anti-monopoly” convention in
September of 1875 which successfully joined Greenback and anti-monopoly forces into one
labor movement. Greenback clubs formed in parts of the anthracite region and the movement
gained so much momentum that in the 1877 state elections, the “Greenback-Labor” ticket won
ten percent of the vote in the anthracite region. The next year, several party members won seats
in the state legislature, including former WBA leader, John F. Welsh.261
Irish nationalism also found its way into the anthracite region in the wake of unionism
and the Molly Maguires. For example, Clan-na-Gael, an Irish republican organization, helped to
fill the vacuum. A successor to the Fenian Brotherhood, Clan-na-Gael represented extreme right
wing Irish-American nationalism that believed in the use of armed force to achieve a republic in
Ireland. Due to the extreme nature, secrecy, and association of Clan-na-Gael with the AOH, with
the trials and executions fresh in the minds of the anthracite community, Clan-na-Gael became
quickly associated with Molly Maguireism.262
Another popular alternative was the Land League in the early 1880s led by Patrick Ford.
The Land League was one of the first ethnic nationalist groups that combined Irish nationalism
and labor radicalism instead of viewing them as conflicting. Ford made it his mission to see to
the fate of the anthracite mine workers and gained major support by the early 1880s. The fact
that the Land League harmonized the labor movement with Irish nationalism forced board
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members like Terrance Powderly, who later became head of the Knights of Labor, to spend a
great deal of time denying accusations that these organizations were merely a cover up for the
Molly Maguires.263 The Knights of Labor, which emerged parallel to the Land League in the
anthracite region, also came under attack as being the Molly Maguires under a new name
because of the Knights of Labor’s secrecy and rapid expansion in the region after the collapse of
the WBA in 1875.
The Knights of Labor temporarily filled the vacuum left by the WBA, but some miners
still searched for a more satisfactory substitute. In the late 1870s, mine workers created the
Miners’ and Laborers’ Amalgamated Association (M&LAA) with a revival of an industrial
miners’ union and with the WBA model in mind. The M&LAA ultimately failed, but thirteen
years later, the first United Mine Workers (UMW) union lodge in Schuylkill County was
organized in Forestville. The UMW flourished in the coal fields, eventually inviting new Eastern
European immigrants into the fold. Originally, mine operators brought Eastern European
immigrant workers into the mines in the 1870s and 1880s to offset Irish industrial militancy and
they were met with much disdain from the Irish workers. Ironically, the new immigrants’
willingness to take on the coal companies came to match, and sometimes surpass, that of the
Irish. On September 10, 1897, three hundred Slavic strikers marched on a colliery in Lattimer,
Luzerne County. One hundred and fifty sheriff’s deputies opened fire on the strikers and killed at
least nineteen of the miners and wounded thirty-two more.264 The coal companies’ long-standing
efforts to keep workers separated by ethnicity had come to an end.
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By 1900, the UMW had achieved much success in uniting workers of all nationalities and
prepared for an epic showdown with the coal monopoly in 1902. In the true tradition of Molly
Maguireism, 140,000 workers ceased work and marched out of the coal pits. The Pennsylvania
National Guard was dispatched to the anthracite region to supplement the Coal and Iron Police
along with private detectives and deputies. Echoes from the past continued when on August 4,
union leader William Purcell was assassinated supposedly by a deputy who then fled the scene.
On September 3, a dynamite blast exploded a Coal Castle man’s home because he continued to
work during the strike. The strike succeeded in shutting down the industry for five months and
ended with a pay raise and a shorter day for the miners.265
The UMW was a short lived victory for the miners. During World War I, consumers
turned to other fuel sources as the coal industry could no longer meet the demand. The Great
Depression brought further devastation as coal mines closed and put hundreds out of work.
Unemployed miners resorted to digging into mountain sides, opening illegal mines on coal
company land, and bootlegging coal. When the Coal and Iron Police attempted to shut down
their operations, the bootleggers unionized and fought back. Minersville, now dominated by
Ukrainians, Lithuanians, and Russians, emerged at the center of this militancy. The town
contributed a large number of leaders to labor movements in the anthracite fields and “always
raised more money and sent more people to rallies and marches than other, comparable
communities.”266 This militancy, and the continuing influence of immigrant peasant solidarity in
an industrial setting, was part of long legacy of labor activism associated with the Molly
Maguires in the Pennsylvania anthracite region.
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However, the fact that labor’s opposition associated all of these organizations formed to
support labor after the executions with Molly Maguireism also speaks to Gowen’s legacy too.
The work he did to condemn the Mollies as ruthless barbarians cast a long shadow, stigmatizing
labor for decades after the Long Strike and trials. Gowen effectively succeeded in getting people
to view labor activism as a form of terrorism.
The coal monopoly continued its decline and bootleggers thrived as sixty-five percent of
illegal mining took place on Reading Coal and Iron lands; later, they formed their own union.
Yet, the state government refused to intervene for fear of bloodshed or mass starvation. During
their reign of power, the corporations made many enemies and once the crisis hit, no one was
willing to defend them. Governor George Earle made his opinion known that the companies had
brought the decline on themselves. “They brought these people into the coal region, let them
build their homes and churches, and then closed down the mines to concentrate their operations
so that they could make bigger profits. They made millions of dollars from labor of these men
who are now unemployed. They can’t let them starve.”267 Between four and six million tons of
anthracite were being stolen annually by 1935 and sold at a large discount. As a result, the coal
companies lost about $32 million a year. The coal companies were forced to close more mines to
cut their losses which created more bootleg miners in a cruel, descending spiral.268 The Reading
Coal Company finally declared bankruptcy in February 1937; the most powerful of the Molly
Maguire antagonists had fallen.
Interpretation of the Molly Maguires has always been a source of contention amongst
historians, but none, taken alone, gives the whole picture. The Molly Maguires filled a range of
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roles dictated by the ebb and flow of the labor movement as manifested in the Pennsylvania
anthracite region: a politically active fraternal order, a predecessor to trade unionism, and an
ideal that filled the vacuum that failed unionism left behind. For the Mollies, murder was politics
by other means. Draft resistance and labor activism were strategies for defending the Irish and
mining community exploited by the draft and mine operators and later Franklin B. Gowen and
the coal monopoly. The American Molly Maguires grew organically out of the world of
American war and industry and the atmosphere created in the coal fields. They drew from the
peasant traditions of the agrarian societies in Ireland and adapted them to create their own
movement and class consciousness. The widespread use of “Molly Maguire” indicated the
reluctance of men like Bannan, Gowen, the operators, the Pinkertons, and other nativist
Americans to accept the idea that Irish immigrants could possess class consciousness, let alone
an industrial worker mindset.
Molly Maguireism, a clandestine force which acted alongside the unions during the Civil
War and after, helped the labor movement succeed where predecessors had failed. The WBA and
the Union Benevolent Association before it, raised the living standards of anthracite workers.
The WBA showed miners and laborers the benefit of collective bargaining as their wages rose to
a level unheard of in the industry’s history as well as the limitations and perils of secret society
anonymity.269
The peasant solidarity at the heart of the Molly Maguires became the industrial solidarity
that served as the foundation of the WBA and later the United Mine Workers. Guns and coffin
notices of the Mollies were done away with in favor of collective bargaining and open methods
of unionism. Rather than die in the prison yards of Mauch Chunk and Pottsville as Franklin
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Gowen had hoped, the Molly Maguire’s legacy encouraged further movements, and in doing so,
transcended time and location. The Molly Maguireism ideal consisted of a deep seated
conviction that the deck is stacked against the little guy and that corporations operate by their
own laws, manipulate public institutions, and coerce their opponents in pursuit of profit. It also
upheld the belief that collective violence and retributive justice were justifiable albeit illegal
ways to help even the odds. This mindset was far from universal. The Mollies made up a small
subset of the region’s Irish immigrants.270 Nonetheless, Jack Kehoe illustrated the Molly
Maguire worldview during an interview in his prison cell before his execution:
Mr. Gowen had scarcely gotten warm in his seat as president of a carrying
company before his idea of empire began to take shape. Knowing the profits of
coal mining…he determined to monopolize the mining as well as the carrying of
coal. So he organized the Philadelphia and Reading Coal and Iron Company
under a bogus charter, ‘yanked’ through the Pennsylvania Legislature under a
concealed name, which gave unlimited powers to the company to do everything
almost.271
Even though the trade union and the Molly Maguires differed in strategy, they fought for
justice and workplace improvement at an individual and local level. There is no evidence that
the Molly Maguires saw their struggle as part of a greater regional or national conflict between
social classes, yet they fought to defend a particular vision of what was just in labor relations.
By contrast, the WBA possessed a coherent organizational structure, a collective social vision,
and a well-developed theory of labor relations. It consciously understood the wider implications
of its attempt to represent the members of one social class in their dealings with another and
gained recognition for labor as a part of industrial society. The WBA condemned the Molly
Maguires and denounced their violence as a deviation from the proper goals of the labor
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movement.272 The contrasts between the Molly Maguires and the WBA were irrefutable and to
systematically identify them as one and the same, as Gowen as some historians have done, is
also inaccurate. However, to separate the Molly Maguires and trade unionism entirely does not
precisely capture the complexities of their relationship to one another and to labor activism in
the 1860s and 1870s.
The term “Molly Maguire” referred to a real sustained, but sporadic pattern of Irish
violence in the anthracite region of Pennsylvania that unquestionably existed.273 But it also
became synonymous with and a scapegoat for many of the socioeconomic and political ills that
plagued the anthracite region in the 1860s and 1870s. Moreover, it offered men like Benjamin
Bannan a convenient explanation for the contradictions that existed within the industry and that
served as an affront to the free labor ideology he so coveted. As unionism began to take hold,
the term “Molly Maguire” expanded to refer to all forms of labor activism against the rise of the
corporation and monopoly. Molly Maguireism extended the demonization of the Irish onto
organized labor in general.
Much of the history on the Molly Maguires was rewritten in the 1970s when a
movement was organized in Schuylkill County to obtain a posthumous pardon for Molly
Maguire “King” John Kehoe. At the head of the movement was his granddaughter and great
grandson who owned Wayne Hotel in Girardville (previously John Kehoe’s tavern, the Hibernia
House). On September 6, 1978, Pennsylvania Governor Milton J. Shapp issued a statement in
favor of the Molly Maguires. He announced, “In an era of shortened work weeks and paid
vacations, it is impossible for us to imagine the plight of the nineteenth century miners in
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Pennsylvania’s anthracite region.” Shapp further argued that Kehoe’s popularity among the
Irish workers struck fear in Franklin Gowen and led to the controversial trials and executions.
He concluded that the whole affair was a miscarriage of justice: “but we can be proud of the
men known as the Molly Maguires because they defiantly faced allegations which attempted to
make trade unionism a criminal conspiracy.” Governor Shapp, joined with the family of John
Kehoe and the Labor History Society, turned the Molly Maguires into martyrs. On January 12,
Governor Shapp signed the posthumous pardon for John Kehoe that was presented by the
Pennsylvania Board of Pardons. On June 21, 1980, exactly 103 years after Black Thursday, the
Commonwealth created a plaque in honor of the Molly Maguires and placed at Schuylkill
County Prison.274 The plaque reads:
Here in this Schuylkill County prison yard on June 21, 1877, the largest mass
execution in Pennsylvania took place with the hanging of six alleged “Molly
Maguire” leaders. That same day, four other alleged “Mollies” were hanged at
Mauch Chunk in Carbon County. Between 1877 and 1879, twenty alleged
“Mollies” were hanged in Bloomsburg, Columbia County, Mauch Chunk, Carbon
County and Pottsville, Schuylkill County. One hundred and one years following
the hanging of Jack Kehoe, December 18, 1878, in this Schuylkill County Prison,
the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania granted posthumous pardon to Kehoe,
reflecting the judgment of many historians that the trials and executions were part
of a repression directed against the fledgling mineworkers’ union of that historic
period.
Until the 1970s, the Molly Maguires continued to hold an air of shame and fear.
However, as demonstrated by Governor Shapp’s pardon, there has been a relatively recent
revival of pride in Molly Maguirism. Today, in various towns in the coal region of Pennsylvania
“Molly Maguire Days” celebrate Irish pride, and the legacy of the secret society and retributive
justice. One hundred years too late, the Mollies were finally publicly exonerated. Even though
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the Molly Maguires died at the end of a rope, their legacy continues to live on in the hearts and
minds of their ancestors and fellow Irish-Pennsylvanians.
We must not forget that the American labor wars and the battles and skirmishes in
between were violent, bloody, and filled with bitterness, illegality, deception, immorality, and
conflict. They were not always the friendly and orderly steps towards progress that some
historians have portrayed them to be. These aspects of labor history must be understood in order
to fully understand our present. The Molly Maguires committed violent and illegal activities in
response to the deception and immorality of Franklin B. Gowen, the Pinkertons, and the
Reading Coal and Iron Company, and because of this, played a crucial role in the union
movement and in securing the rights of workingmen.
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